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I. INTRODUCTION: UPRIVER DOWNTOWN
It is a site known by many names-the Cornfield, the
Cornfields, the Chinatown Cornfield, the Chinatown Yards. No
cornfields are found there today. Before California became a state,
however, there were cornfields on the site. These cornfields were
irrigated by water from the nearby Los Angeles River, known then
as the Rio de Porciuncula.
Today the Cornfield is a vacant forty-acre parcel located within
a triangle formed by the Hollywood Freeway on the south, the
Pasadena-Harbor Freeway on the northwest, and the Los Angeles
River on the east.2 To be more geographically precise, it is the nar-
row crescent-shaped lot located between North Broadway Street
and North Spring Street and immediately southwest of the North
Broadway Bridge.3 Just above the site's Broadway Street bluffs lies
1. PAIl MORRISON & MARK LAMONICA, RIO LA: TALES FROM THE Los ANGELES RIvER
22 (2001).
2. MARco CENZATTI ET AL., CORNFIELD OF DREAMS: A RESOURCE GUIDE OF FA=S, Is-
SUES, & PRINCIPLES §3 at 83 (report prepared by UCLA Urban Planning Department and
Occidental College's Urban and Environmental Policy Institute) (June 2000) (on file with
author).
3. Jan Chatten-Brown & William F. Delvac, A River Tale-The Cornfield to Taylor Yard:
From Industrial Droelopment Plans to State Parks' Acquisition, CAL. LAND USE L. & POL'y REp.,
Oct. 2002, at 3.
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Chinatown.4 To the east of the Cornfield the concrete-encased Los
Angeles River makes its way towards the Pacific. Beyond the river is
William Mead Homes-the oldest public housing project in the
city.5 To the west are historic Union Station, downtown's skyscrap-
ers, and Olvera Street-the site of Los Angeles' original eighteenth
century pueblo.6
The Cornfield is vacant now for two reasons. First, the railyard
on the site was shut down in the early 1990s, its tracks and switch-
ing stations removed.7 The railyard, first established by the South-
ern Pacific Railroad in the 1870s and later operated by Union
Pacific Railroad, was no longer needed due to declining rail us-
age.s Second, a reindustrialization project for the Cornfield pro-
posed in the late 1990s-calling for more than 900,000 square feet
of new manufacturing and warehouse space on the site-was de-
railed.9 The project was derailed through a combination of effec-
tive community political organizing, aggressive litigation, an
innovative settlement agreement, and the timely passage of a pub-
lic bond measure.
Although vacant, big plans are in the works for the Cornfield.
As a result of the events alluded to above, the Trust for Public Land
(a land conservation group) purchased the Cornfield in 2001, and
then sold the property to California State Parks, an agency of the
State of California. Once the toxic conditions caused by the site's
century-long use as a railyard are remediated, the Cornfield will
become a public park in downtown Los Angeles.
The tale of how the Cornfield emerged as parkland is revealing
on several levels. It provides a window onto the past, helps explain
why Los Angeles developed where it did, and reveals the city's com-
plex historical relationship with the river that runs through it. The
tale of the Cornfield also highlights recent efforts to remedy the
lack of public parks in downtown Los Angeles, and to restore the
Los Angeles River's connection to the city. An examination of the
Cornfield further reveals strategies that may be useful to others
seeking to reclaim former urban industrial property as parkland.
4. Id.
5. Robert Garcia, Building Community: Lessons from the Urban Parks Movement in
Los Angeles 7 (2001) (unpublished report by the Center for Law in the Public Interest)
(on file with author).
6. Id.
7. Chatten-Brown & Delvac, supra note 3, at 3.
8. CENZATII ET AL., supra note 2, §3 at 40.
9. Chatten-Brown & Delvac, supra note 3, at 3-4.
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This article begins with an historical survey of the Los Angeles
River. Next, it considers the implications of a comprehensive 1930
park plan for Los Angeles. The 1930 plan was suppressed before it
was published but is now being revived.1o The article then turns to
the Cornfield, and reviews the activities and people associated with
the site. The section that follows recounts the opposition to the
Cornfield's reindustrialization, as well as the organizing and lawsuit
that ultimately stopped the proposed manufacturing-warehouse
project. The article goes on to deconstruct the deal that initially
enabled the Trust for Public Land, and later the State of Califor-
nia, to acquire the Cornfield. The next section evaluates the polit-
ics involved in designing the new Cornfield state park. Lastly, the
article identifies what lessons the Cornfield may hold for Los Ange-
les, for California, and for the rest of the nation.
II. THE STRANGE PATH OF THE Los ANGELES RIvER
Growing up in Los Angeles, I found the location of downtown
to be an enigma. Located far inland from the coast, it was removed
from the ports near San Pedro Bay. The city's older neighbor-
hoods-such as Pasadena, Burbank, and Hollywood-were near
downtown, yet they seemed geographically illogical. Downtown Los
Angeles and its surrounding neighborhoods were denied the scen-
ery, cooling breezes, beaches, and ocean views offered by the Pa-
cific, as well as proximity to the ocean's food supply. Considered in
the context of its current landscape, the origins of the city made no
sense.
Other modern Los Angeles residents have been similarly puz-
zled. As Blake Gumprecht notes in his recent book The Los Angeles
River: Its Life, Death and Possible Rebirth:
Why, I had wondered, wasn't [Los Angeles's historic center] on
the ocean? Or at the base of some impressive mountain? Why was
it there on the edge of a plain, fifteen miles from the Pacific
Ocean, ten miles from the San Gabriel Mountains, with no imme-
diately apparent advantages of location?ll
The answer to both Gumprecht's question and mine lay in the
network of deep concrete culverts that cuts through the city. The
main stem of this network runs from north of downtown, south-
10. CENZATTI ET AL., supra note 2, §2 at 99-100.
11. BLAKE GUMPRECHT, THE Los ANGELES RIvER: ITs LIFE, DEATH AND POSSIBLE RE-
BIRTH 4 (1999).
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ward to Los Angeles' harbor.12 Other stems travel along the north-
ern base of the Santa Monica Mountains in the San Fernando
Valley and west from downtown through Ballona Creek to Santa
Monica Bay.13 These concrete culverts-nearly waterless during dry
periods yet a rushing torrent during storms-are what remains of
the Los Angeles River. And it is the river that explains both why
and where the city of Los Angeles exists. 14
The ocean may provide fish, but people cannot drink seawater,
nor can they irrigate crops with it. The greater Los Angeles area is
vast, but its natural supply of usable surface freshwater is not. In
fact, in the region comprising the San Fernando Valley and the Los
Angeles Basin, there was initially only one reliable year-round
source of above-ground freshwater. 15 This source was located in the
Glendale Narrows, a depression wedged between the eastern edge
of the Santa Monica Mountains and the western edge of the
Verdugo Mountains, near today's Elysian Park.16 Rainwater falling
on the floor of the San Fernando Valley and runoff from the north-
ern slopes of the Santa Monica Mountains converged in the under-
ground of the valley's southern end and then traveled eastY This
subterranean stream remained pinned against the northern base
of the Santa Mountains until it reached the Glendale Narrows. 18
There it was pushed up to the surface and, redirected by the base
of the Verdugo Mountains, turned sharply south. 19
12. CAL. COASTAL CONSERVANCY, WETLANDS OF THE Los ANGELES RivER WATERSHED:
PROFILES AND RESTORATION OPPORTUNITIES 2 (2000) [hereinafter COASTAL CONSERVANCY
WETLANDS REpORT].
13. GUMPRECHT, supra note 11, at 229 (map entitled Flood Control Features-Los An-
geles River Drainage Area).
14. MORRISON & LAMONICA, supra note 1, at 21 ("And yet it was a river, and still is,
somewhere in there. Without it, there would be no Los Angeles."); see also GUMPRECHT,
supra note 11, at 6-7:
The evolution of the river can also tell us much about greater Los Angeles, not
only because the town from which it grew could not have existed without the
river, but also because the river's evolution paralleled the growth of Los Angeles
from village to city to metropolis. The story of the Los Angeles River is a fre-
quen t1y remarkable, sometimes bizarre, and ultimately tragic tale of how an often
overlooked element of the geography of one of the world's great cities shaped its
development and was, in turn, remade in its image.
15. Alan Loomis, The Los Angeles River: Past, Present, and Possibilities (2000) (un-
published graduate thesis, Southern California Institute of Architecture) (abbreviated ex-
hibit version of thesis available at http://www.deliriouslaw.net/lareiver.about.htm) .
16. ld.; GUMPRECHT, supra note 11, at 15-16.
17. GUMPRECHT, supra note 11, at 15-16.
18. ld.
19. ld.
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Mter passing through the Glendale Narrows and then passing
near what is now downtown Los Angeles, the course of this surface
stream became wilder as it entered the expansive Los Angeles
plain. Due to its seasonal nature, it did not develop a deep
riverbed or high banks, leaving it free to pursue the path of least
resistance.2o
For a time, the main stem of the river headed south towards
San Pedro Bay. However, in 1825 it carved a new westerly channel
towards Santa Monica Bay along what is now known as Ballona
Creek.21 Plowing its way through today's Boyle Heights, it tore away
earth and stone leaving behind white cliffs that locals named
Paredon Blanco: the big white wal1.22 Joined by waters coming off
the southern slopes of the Santa Monica Mountains, the river fre-
quently overflowed its low banks to create a vast marshland called
Las Cienegas, or "the swamps."23 La Cienega Boulevard, one of Los
Angeles' major streets, is a testament to this lost marsh.24 Some-
times the river made it all the way to the ocean at what is now Playa
Del Rey.25 Other times it ended short of the Pacific.26
In 1867, the main stem of the Los Angeles River changed
course again.27 A storm drove the river out of its westerly riverbed
and forced it into one that the San Gabriel River (another temper-
20. As Gumprecht describes it:
[T]heir channels were shallow and poorly defined. They were incapable of con-
taining the great quantities of water that would rush from the mountains during
heavy rains. Sudden storms transformed normally dry streams into raging tor·
rents, often in a matter of hours and sometimes with the sun still shining. Usually
placid river overflowed their banks, inundating large areas and occasionally turn-
ing portions of the coastal plain into a huge lake. Swirling floodwaters, carrying
great loads of rock, sediment, and trees, cut new channel through the earth and
dug depressions in the soil. ...
Id. at 12. For a similar description, see Gary Pitzer, The Los Angeles River, WESTERN WATER,
Nov./Dec. 2003, at 4:
Beguiling in its apparent tranquility most of the year, the river's face would
quickly change under the weight of fast-moving storms. Untold volumes of water,
loaded with sediment and debris, would surge downhill, seeking the path of least
resistance. The once meandering river became a torrent, easily broaching its
banks and spreading across the wide, flat terrain.
21. COASTAl.. CONSERVANCY WETl..ANDS REpORT, supra note 12, at 2.
22. MORRlSON & LAMONICA, supra note 1, at 35.
23. GUMPRECHT, supra note 11, at 17.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 17.
26. Id. at 19 (" [I] t is unlikely that the river carried enough water to reach the sea
most of the year.").
27. COASTAl.. CONSERVA,'1CY WETl..ANDS REpORT, supra note 12, at 2.
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amental Southern California waterway) had recently abandoned.28
On its way towards San Pedro Bay, it was joined by other streams-
such as the Arroyo Seco-that carried the stormwaters which
poured off the jagged, 9000 foot-high San Bernardino Moun-
tains. 29 Just as with its westerly flow, sometimes the river's main
stem made it to San Pedro Bay, sometimes it did not. 30 Just as the
river had done on its western course, after 1867 it crested over the
banks of its southern course, creating enormous temporary sloughs
in what are now the cities of Wilmington and Long Beach.31 Even
when it reached the ocean, the river's mouth frequently changed
location, shifting as silt deposits blocked one channel and forced
stormwaters to create another.32
There was freshwater in Los Angeles' coastal plain, but it was
seasonal and uncontained. It was these very conditions that created
the ecology of early Los Angeles. It is a lost landscape that bears
little visual relation to what we see today. This lost landscape ex-
plains Los Angeles' early reputation as a "garden paradise"-a rep-
utation at odds with the water-starved conditions now associated
with the region.33 As Patt Morrison and Mark Lamonica reveal in
Rio LA: Tales from the Los Angeles River.
The river ambled across a Los Angeles that is unimaginably wet-
ter than it is today-a terrain looking more like England than
contemporary Southern California. In the river's broad reach,
wetlands and woodlands thrived. Immense stands of sycamore
and cottonwood and oak and alder stood like high-rises above
tangles of willow and berry brambles and fields of grasses.... It
wasn't rainfall that made this plain green and lush, but the river,
spilling down from the northeast and the northwest onto the
long, flat miles of the Los Angeles Basin, where it made itself into
a braided lacework of waterways. . . .34
The river's meanderings across the Los Angeles basin may have
created a lush landscape, but its wildness did not lend itself to
human settlement. In the basin, encampments, farmland, and live-
stock were at constant risk from flooding. In between the floods,
the "lacework of waterways" recounted by Morrison and Lamonica
28. Id.
29. Id.; GUMPRECHT, supra note 11, at 10 fig. 1.1.
30. See COASTAL CONSERVANCY WETlANDS REpORT, supra note 12.
31. GUM PRECHT, supra note 11, at 17.
32. Id. at 19.
33. Id. at 2; Pitzer, supra note 20, at 4 ("The periodic flooding provided the backdrop
for a rich and diverse habitat in which a variety of fish, birds, plants and wildlife thrived.").
34. MORRISON & lAMONICA, supra note I, at 29-30.
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consisted largely of shallow muddy pockets of still water that were
unsuitable for drinking. Given these conditions, the region's early
inhabitants did not locate their villages in the coastal plain. In-
stead, they wisely chose to settle near the one place where the
river's freshwater surface flow was continuous and contained-the
Glendale Narrows.35
Just downriver from the Glendale Narrows, the pre-colonial
people that inhabited the area that would become Los Angeles (re-
ferred to as the Gabrielinos by the Spanish Missionaries) estab-
lished their village ofYangna.36 The Spanish established £1 Pueblo
de la Reina de Los Angeles near Yangna in 1781.37 Mter California
was seized by the United States from Mexico in the War of 1848,
Los Angeles' city center was built near the site of the pueblo.38 The
founding of Los Angeles can therefore be traced directly back to
the surface freshwater that passed between the Santa Monica and
Verdugo Mountains.
In the late nineteenth century, construction in Los Angeles in-
tensified in the areas around downtown.39 By the early twentieth
century, the city's built environment had begun to move into the
coastal plain.40 This development included houses, stores, ware-
houses, and railroad bridges and tracks. During this period, per-
ceptions of the river began to change in two important ways.
First, in 1913 the Los Angeles-Owens Rivers Aqueduct was com-
pletedY The Owens River collected the flow of streams in the East-
ern Sierra Mountains, including those from Mount Whitney, the
highest peak in the continental United States.42 Mter 1913, the
aqueduct replaced the Los Angeles River as the main source of
freshwater for Los Angeles.43 As its value as a water supply source
diminished, the river's tangible benefits to the city's residents be-
came less clear.
Second, as Los Angeles' built environment intensified and ex-
panded, the seasonal flooding caused by the river became less tol-
erable. The value of the city's land grew at exponential rates, and
35. Loomis, supra note 15.
36. GUMPRECHT, supra note 11, at 29, 31, 37.
37. fd. at 43.
38. fd. at 56-57.
39. fd. at 156-67.
40. fd.
41. COASTAL CONSERVANCY RIVER WETLANDS REpORT, supra note 12, at 6.
42. GUMPRECHT, supra note 11, at 105.
43. fd.
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between 1914 and 1931 the total assessed value of real property in
Los Angeles County increased by 2600%.44 Yet, the Los Angeles
River overilowed its banks in 1914, again in 1916, and then in 1934
with particularly disastrous results. 45 According to historical ac-
counts, on New Year's Day 1934, a twenty-foot-high wall of water,
mud, and rocks came roaring down Verdugo Wash, one of the
river's tributaries in the foothills above downtown.46 Forty-nine
people were killed, forty-five people were never found, two hun-
dred homes were destroyed, four hundred homes were rendered
uninhabitable, and eight hundred automobiles were buried in
sludge.47
Prior to the 1934 flood, there had been piecemeal local efforts
to contain the river-a patchwork of dams, earthen levees, and
pile-and-wire fences. 48 Mter the flooding that year, however, Los
Angeles County officials appealed to the federal government for
help. With the launch of President Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal
in 1933, the timing of this appeal could not have been better. In
1935, President Roosevelt approved $13.9 million in Works Pro-
gress Administration (WPA) funds, to be administered by the
United States Army Corps of Engineers, for flood control projects
in Los Angeles.49 Most of the WPA funds were to be used for chan-
nel improvements on the Los Angeles River and its tributaries.50
As work pursuant to the initial WPA flood control funds began,
however, another flood struck Los Angeles in 1938. The 1938 flood
was even more destructive than the one in 1934. As one historian
describes it:
Five people were thrown to their deaths in North Hollywood
when the Lankershiem Boulevard bridge over the Los Angeles
River collapsed. Ten more drowned in Long Beach when a
wooden pedestrian bridge just upstream from the river's mouth
gave way. Raging waters cut wide new bends for the river on the
north side of Griffith Park, washing away huge sections of two
major highways. Numerous buildings were destroyed at Warner
Bros. Pictures. Houses were floated from their foundations, and
some washed into the river. Sewage lines ruptured, threatening
public health. Near downtown Los Angeles, thirty thousand
44. Id. at 201.
45. Id. at 167-71, 183-84, 203-04.
46. Id. at 203.
47. Id. at 173-98.
48. Id. at 205.
49. Id. at 206.
50. Id.
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board feet of lumber, to be used in the construction of a bridge
to the new Union Station, was swept into the river and carried to
the sea, much of it later washing up on beaches near the river's
mouth. A gas main underneath the Ninth Street bridge was rup-
tured by raging floodwaters, and its fumes were ignited by a pass-
ing railroad car. The resulting explosion sent flames shooting
into the air, and for a brief time the river actually looked like it
was on fire. Throughout the county, ninety-one railroad and
highway bridges were destroyed or badlJ: damaged, some of them
twisted nearly beyond recognition.... 1
Following the 1938 flood, channel improvement took on a
more singular purpose-to deepen the river and its tributaries and
encase their beds and banks in concrete. This would create a
"water freeway" to funnel greater Los Angeles' stormwaters into
one main, paved channel that could swiftly shoot its sporadic tor-
rent into the Pacific Ocean.52 Much more than $13.9 million
would be needed to create this water freeway, so in 1941 the
United States Army Corps of Engineers sought an additional
$268.2 million for Los Angeles flood control projects.53 Congress
granted this funding, pursuant to the 1941 Flood Control Act.54
Between 1944 and 1958, Congress would authorize another $146.5
million for Los Angeles County channel improvements.55 By the
late 1950s, Los Angeles' water freeway was complete, and as far as
the United States Army Corps of Engineers and most of the city's
residents were concerned, the Los Angeles River ceased to exist.56
With the completion of the water freeway, development could
now push right up to the river's banks without fear of flooding. As
commercial and industrial buildings crowded up against the con-
crete gully, the river was degraded from something that needed
containment into something that needed to be concealed. As Mor-
rison and Lamonica note:
Los Angeles brags about its beaches and its mountains. On the
subject of its river, however, it is silent. Within the river's banks
lies more acreage than Central Park-walled up, fenced off,
locked away from human eyes, like the loony aunt hidden in the
attic, not to be discussed in front of company.57
In the mid-1980s, however, Los Angeles' hidden river began to
51. [d. at 216-18.
52. [d. at 221-22.
53. [d.
54. [d. at 222.
55. [d. at 224.
56. [d. at 224-32.
57. MORRISON & LAMONICA, supra note 1, at 20.
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stir, or perhaps more accurately, people began to stir the river.58 In
1985, author and poet Lewis MacAdams staged a production at the
Wallenboyd Theatre that he described as "the first act of a forty-
year artwork to bring the Los Angeles River back to life through a
combination of art, politics and magic."59 The Wallenboyd Thea-
tre, which has since been closed, was located in downtown Los An-
geles' flower-and-produce district.6o Among other things, the
production involved MacAdams in a white suit and white face-paint
channeling the ghost of William Mulholland, the former head of
the city's Department of Water and Power responsible for the con-
struction of the Los Angeles-Owens River Aqueduct.61 Although
the production was not well-received by the Los Angeles Times' thea-
tre critic, the response it received from the public prompted Mac-
Adams to found a new organization-Friends of the Los Angeles
River (FoLAR).62 The creation of FoLAR served as an intellectual
and political catalyst for other re-evaluations of the river's connec-
tion to the city.
In 1990, the City of Los Angeles Planning Department released
its Proposed Los Angeles River Greenbelt Corridor Feasibility Study.63
Prompted by the study, Los Angeles' Mayor Tom Bradley created a
river task force, whose efforts culminated in Los Angeles County's
adoption of a Los Angeles River Master Plan in 1996.64 Among other
things, this plan called for a continuous, fifty-one mile tree-lined
bikeway along the river's banks.65
In 1993, the California State Coastal Conservancy (a state
agency) published a report entided Los Angeles River: Park and Recre-
ation Area Study.66 This study was prepared in response to the state
legislature's request for assistance in identifying beneficial uses of
the river, including assessing the river's potential for open space,
58. Pitzer, supra note 20, at 10 ("The river's role in Los Angeles' consciousness and
political awareness took a noteworthy tum in the mid-1980s, as those who saw it as more
than just a forgotten storm drain stepped forward and spoke on its behalf.").
59. MORRISON & LAMONICA, supra note 1, at 115.
60. Id.
61. Id.; GUMPRECHT, supra note II, at 95-105.
62. Id.; see also Tad Friend, RiV(ff ofAngels-Can Water Again Flow Freely Through L.A.-
Without Swamping the City?, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 26, 2004, at 45.
63. COASTAL CONSERVANCY WETLANDS REpORT, supra note 12, at 1I3.
64. The River Through Downtown Conference Program 7 (Feb. 28, 1998) (on file
with the author) [hereinafter The River Through Downtown].
65. Joanna Miller, Taking Back the River, LAND & PEOPLE, Fall 2000, at 3, 5.
66. COASTAL CONSERVANCY WETLANDS REpORT, supra note 12, at 113.
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recreation, and wildlife habitat.67
In 1998, FoLAR, the Sierra Club, and the Urban Resources
Partnership organized a conference at Los Angeles' Mark Taper
Auditorium.68 The conference, entided The River Through Down-
town, was the result of focus groups held at elementary schools and
community centers in the neighborhoods of Cypress Park, China-
town, Litde Toyko, and Boyle Heights.69 Following these focus
groups, a design team gathered in the Grand Concourse of Union
Station to hear further testimony.70 This design team included
noted Los Angeles architect and planner Arthur Golding, who
teaches at the University of Southern California.71 At The River
Through Downtown conference, the design team presented a report
that summarized the results of the focus group sessions and testi-
mony, and presented proposals for a series of projects to better
integrate the Los Angeles River and downtown Los Angeles. In his
introduction to the conference report, FoLAR's Lewis MacAdams
wrote:
The results of [the design team's] work is being presented to you
today. Though it may inspire some and outrage others, it is our
sincere hope that these efforts will plant some seeds that will
grow into projects· that will benefit everyone who lives along,
works beside or visits the River Through Downtown.72
In the late 1990s, the California office of the Trust for Public
Land (TPL) launched its Los Angeles River Greenway Program.73
TPL is a national, non-profit land conservation group headquar-
tered in San Francisco that employs its expertise in real estate fi-
nance to protect land as open space for recreation and wildlife.
Since its inception, TPL's Los Angeles River Greenway has worked
with local groups, city and county officials, and public agencies to
help identify and fund park improvement projects along the
river.74
Lastly, in 1999 the California legislature enacted the San
Gabriel and Lower Los Angeles Rivers and Mountains Conservancy
67. Id.
68. The River Through Downtown, supra note 64, at 2.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 5.
71. Id. at A3.
72. Id. at 5.
73. Trust for Pub. Land, Los Angeles River Greenway Program, available at http:/ /
www.tpI.org/tier3_cdI.cfm?contenUtem_id=5309 (last visited Mar. 10,2004) (on file with
author).
74. Id.
2004] LOS ANGELES' CORNFIELD 287
Act, which created a new agency, the Rivers and Mountains Conser-
vancy (RMC).75 In 2001, RMC co-published a report entitled Com-
mon Ground-From the Mountains to the Sea: Watershed and Open Space
Plan for San Gabriel and Los Angeles Rivers.76 This report set forth
ecology and recreation-based policy priorities to guide RMC's
work.
Although most of the Los Angeles River remains entombed in
concrete, the recent flood of initiatives indicates that perceptions
of the river have, once again, begun to shift. There is a growing
recognition that, despite the best efforts of the United States Army
Corps of Engineers, the river still exists. It is an existence that is
part history, part ecology and part a vision of what could be.
III. 1930 OLMSTED-BARTHOLOMEW PARK PLAN FOR Los ANGELES:
LEFT ON THE SHELF
As Los Angeles grew, it became clear that something needed to
be done about the river. There was disagreement, however, about
what this something should be. Not everyone shared the Army
Corps of Engineers' vision of a water freeway. Other plans had
called for flood control measures that would maintain the river as a
living resource.
The most comprehensive alternative vision for the river was
presented in 1930, in a document drafted by Frederick Law Olm-
sted Jr. and Harlan Batholomew, entitled Parks, Playgrounds and
Beaches for the Los Angeles Region (1930 Olmsted-Bartholomew Park
Plan).77 The 1930 Olmsted-Bartholomew Park Plan's primary subject
was not so much the Los Angeles River as the need to improve city
planning in Los Angeles, although in the authors' minds the two
topics were very much intertwined. The plan expanded on previ-
ous publications that had also addressed the problem of Los Ange-
les' dwindling open space, such as Dana Bartlett's 1907 book, The
Better City: A Sociological Study of a Modern City,78 and Griffith]. Grif-
fith's 1910 book, Parks, Boulevards and Playgrounds.79 Before pub-
75. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 32,600-621 (Deering 2004).
76. Cal. Res. Agency, Rivers & Mountains Conservancy, Common Ground-From the
Mountains to the Sea: Watershed and Open Space Plan for San Gabriel and Los Angeles
Rivers (Oct. 2001) (unpublished report on file with author) [hereinafter Common
Ground].
77. GREG HISE & WILLIAM DEVERELL, EDEN BY DESIGN: THE 1930 OLMSTED-BARTHOLO-
MEW PLAN FOR THE Los A..'1GELES REGION (2000).
78. Id. at 12.
79. Id. at 16.
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lishing his book, Griffith had donated five square miles to the City
of Los Angeles in the late nineteenth century to create Griffith
Park.80
The 1930 Olmsted-Bartholomew Park Plan was commissioned by
the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce before the stock market
crash of 1929.81 The authors selected to prepare the report were
two of the most respected landscape architects in the United
States.82 Frederick Law Olmsted,jr. ("Olmstedjr."), was a principal
with Olmsted Brothers, the Massachusetts firm founded by his fa-
ther, Frederick Law Olmsted, Sr., the man often credited with in-
venting the profession of landscape architecture.83 Harland
Bartholomew was a principal with Harland Bartholomew and Asso-
ciates, of St. Louis.84
Although Olmsted and Bartholomew were chosen because of
their reputations as independent visionary thinkers, the Los Ange-
les Chamber of Commerce was not prepared to accept the inde-
pendent vision they produced. The 1930 Olmsted-Bartholomew Park
Plan advocated the creation of parks through the condemnation of
extensive tracts of private lands, zoning to prohibit development
along the flood-prone river, and the establishment of a powerful
new agency to implement this vision.85 These recommendations
proved too much for the chamber's members, many of whom held
interests in lands targeted by the plan for condemnation and haz-
ard zoning, and many of whom feared that the authority of the
proposed agency might eclipse that of the chamber itself.86 Few
80. Id.
81. Id. at 2.
82. Id. at vii.
83. MORRISON & LAMONICA, supra note 1, at 76; WITOLD RByCZVNSKY, A CLEARING IN
THE DISTA1\ICE: FREDERICK LAw OLMSTED AND AMERICA IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 23
(1999) ("[Olmsted Sr.] was a landscape architect before that profession was founded.").
84. HISE & DEVERELL, supra note 77, at 1.
85. Id. at 98-99.
86. Id. at 38-39:
More problematic was the dawning realization by many that the comprehensive
nature of the plan would, by necessity, create the need for equally comprehensive
jurisdictional and supervisory bodies; here lies one of the primary reasons why the
report went flat.... At this point the Chamber balked. Thinking about an inte-
grated park system, one that incorporated beaches and playgrounds, was one
thing. Making the agency that could oversee such a thing was an entirely different
matter.... In essence, the Chamber feared that the child had become the parent.
The planned park board, with itsjurisdictional authorities extending to the crea-
tion of its own police force, simply scared the Chamber members, many of whom
clearly feared that the new body would exert powers over and above the Chamber
itself.
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copies of the plan were printed, and the Los Angeles Chamber of
Commerce did not pursue the plan's recommendations.87 At the
time, it died a quiet death.
The 1930 Olmsted-Bartholomew Park Plan, however, has been
rediscovered by the new generation pressing for increased urban
parkland in Los Angeles and for a restored Los Angeles River. For
this new generation, the plan serves both as evidence of Los Ange-
les' early landscape and a blueprint for what it may become. It is
noteworthy that the year after the creation of the Rivers and Moun-
tains Conservancy (the new agency tasked with overseeing the Los
Angeles River restoration efforts) saw the publication of the first
academic book focused on the Olmsted-Bartholomew plan (the
plan that had originally made the case for just such an agency).
The University of California Press published Eden by Design: The
1930 Olmsted-Bartholomew Plan for the Los Angeles Region in 2000. Eden
by Design includes a complete reproduction of the 1930 plan, with
all of its original drawings and photographs, as well as an introduc-
tory essay co-written by Greg Hise, Professor of Urban Planning at
the University of Southern California, and William Deverell, Pro-
fessor of History at the California Institute of Technology.88 In
their introduction, Hise and Deverell state: "[The 1930 Olmsted-
Batholomew Park Plan] is a compelling document and readers might
well be shocked to see the Los Angeles that was, and then amazed
as they begin to imagine the Los Angeles that might have been had
the plan been adopted and implemented."89
Laurie Olin, of the Philadelphia-based Olin Partnership plan-
ning firm, suggests that there is an even deeper connection be-
tween the 1930 Olmsted-Bartholomew Park Plan and recent proposals
to re-Iandscape the Los Angeles River.90 According to Olin, who
has worked on several Los Angeles park projects, it is not just a
question of rediscovering the 1930 plan:
People are still doing things suggested in the Olmsted-Bartholo-
mew report without even knowing it exists .... The point is, I
knew what this drawing of theirs would be like without ever see-
See also CENZATII ET AL., supra note 2, §2 at 99-100 ("[P]olitical opposition squashed it
before the plan was even officially published."); MORRISON & LAMONICA, supra note 1, at 78
("Businessmen, the demi-gods of Los Angeles, didn't like it one bit, and saw to it that the
plan was filed away and forgotten. Imagine taking all that land off the real estate market.").
87. HISE & DEVERELL, supra note 77, at 7.
88. [d. at back cover.
89. [d. at 52.
90. [d. at 304-05.
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ing it. It is part of the DNA of landscape architects. Olmsted and
Bartholomew called for the Los Angeles River to be developed
with an embankment and a parkway, a grand proposal that is still
talked about and is still not realized. And they talk especially
about the upper reaches of the river alongside Griffith Park. They
hammer away at how to use the lower stretches, the middle
stretches, and the upper stretches of the Los Angeles River. To-
day many people are working on similar schemes.91
As Olin's comments indicate, part of what is so striking about
the riverside components of the 1930 Olmsted-Bartholomew Park Plan
is their common sense. They are not so much bold as they are state-
ments of the obvious. They are the logical policy and land-use solu-
tions that any competent, thoughtful landscape architect or
planner would have reached.
A. The Olmstedian Conception of Urban Parks
A starting point for consideration of the 1930 Olmsted-
Batholomew Park Plan is the legacy of one of the co-authors' fathers,
Frederick Law Olmsted, Sr. ("Olmsted Sr."). The imprint of Olm-
sted Sr.'s approach to city planning in general, and to urban parks
in particular, pervades the plan. Given the influence of Olmsted Sr.
on the first generation of American landscape architects and plan-
ners, this is to be expected.
Olmsted Sr.'s career as a city planner and park designer
spanned from about 1850 to 1900.92 He designed many of the most
important urban parks in North America, including Central Park
in New York City, Mont Royal Park in Montreal, Prospect Park in
Brooklyn, and Belle Isle Park in Detroit.93 Much of his work was
done in collaboration with his partner, Calvert Vaux, with whom
he formed Olmsted Vaux & Co in 1860.94
Olmsted Sr. came from an affluent Connecticut family, and, as
his career progressed, he became even wealthier.95 These circum-
stances enabled him to travel extensively in remote wilderness and
rural areas, such as New Hampshire's White Mountains, Yosemite
Valley in California, and the English countryside.96 This type of
travel, involving vigorous outdoor exercise in rugged terrain, was a
91. Id. at 299, 301-02.
92. See generally RBvCZVNSKY, supra note 83.
93. Id. at 155-79, 269-77, 279-84, 321-25, 350-51.
94. Id. at 192.
95. Id. at 23-27, 29.
96. Id. at 40, 86-87, 236-37, 256-59.
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constant throughout Olmsted Sr.'s life. Olmsted Sr. was also an ac-
tive abolitionist prior to the American Civil War and wrote exten-
sively about the corrosive moral and economic effects of slavery.97
Olmsted Sr.'s experiences in remote wilderness areas and his egali-
tarian values found direct expression in his conception of urban
parks. New York's Central Park is perhaps the most vivid illustra-
tion of the Olmstedian approach.
In the 1850s, the tract of land proposed for Central Park was
not green, was not a meadow, and was not a forest. It was a barren,
weed-strewn expanse, located just north of the existing city.98 Mi-
nus the presence of toxic contamination, the site proposed for
Central Park was similar in many respects to the current condition
of the Cornfield.
As work on Central Park began, Olmsted Sr. made it clear that
his intention was not to create a park that would serve as a
manicured garden for the city's rich. Instead, he was committed to
creating a park that would provide a surrogate wilderness experi-
ence for those who could not afford to travel to the wilderness.99
He wanted rolling hills, lakes, and woods. As Olmsted Sr. explained
to New York City's Park Commission in 1858:
It is one of the great purposes of the Park to supply to the hun-
dreds of thousands of tired workers, who have no opportunity to
spend their summers in the country, a specimen of God's handi-
work that shall be to them, inexpensively, what a month or two in
the White Mountains or the Adirondacks is, at great cost, to those
97. [d. at 106-08, 177, 195-97. A few years before the outbreak of the American Civil
War, Olmsted Sr. published a book, entitled The Cotton Kingdom: A Traveler's Observations on
Cotton and Slavery in the American Slave States.
98. RBVCZVNSKY, supra note 83, at 166:
Illusion lay at the heart of Greensward [the name of the Central Park design
submitted by Olmsted Sr. and Calvert Vaux]. It was all very well to talk of green
fields, limpid waters, and sylvan accessories, but aside from the rock outcroppings
that Vaux and Olmsted incorporated into their design, the site was not rich in
attractive natural features.
99. CENZATrI ET AL., supra note 2, §3 at 94-95:
Central Park in New York City is the first and perhaps the best known of Ameri-
can urban parks built in the U.S. in the latter half of the nineteenth century.
Designed by Calvert Vaux and Frederick Law Olmsted, the 60D-acre park was con-
ceived in the picturesque tradition to give the common people of the city a
chance to nurture their bodies and souls in the respite of nature. Large pastoral
parks such as Central Park were built to combat the urban environmental
problems of the time; overcrowding and disease. There was also a strong moral
idealism on the part of the designers, particularly Olmsted, who saw nature as
'improving' the people who went there. Prior to this era the 'pleasure garden'
escape into natural scenery had been accessible only to the very wealthy....
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in easier circumstances....100
Not all of the members of the Park Commission embraced
Olmsted Sr.'s vision for Central Park, and the Park Commission
had ultimate authority over the park's plan and budget. Some com-
missioners thought the plan was too ambitious and too costly.10l
For instance, commissioners Robert Dillon and August Belmont
proposed adding a straight, two-mile carriage promenade that
would have cut a huge, manicured swath through Olmsted's natu-
ralist landscape. 102 Olmsted defended his design against Dillon,
Belmont, and others who questioned his conception of what Cen-
tral Park should be:
The time will come when New York will be built up, when all the
grading and filling will be done, and when the picturesquely-va-
ried rocky formations of the Island will have been converted into
foundations for rows of monotonous straight streets, and piles of
erect, angular buildings. There will be no suggestion left of its
present varied surface, with the single exception of the Park.
Then the priceless value of the present pictures~ue-outlinesof
the ground will be more distinctly perceived.... I 3
Although Olmsted Sr. made some minor design concessions to
appease his critics, he convinced the Park Commission to adhere
to the basic elements of his initial plan.104 The Central Park of to-
day is a fair approximation of the illusion of countryside and wil-
derness that Olmsted Sr. set out to create. The success of Olmsted
Sr.'s illusion is testified to by a recent comment to me from my
mother, who spent her childhood in New York City. As a very
young girl growing up, my mother had assumed that all of Manhat-
tan once looked like Central Park, and that the park was a natural
preserve. 105 Olmsted Sr. would have taken my mother's mistaken
childhood assumption as high praise.
The scope of Olmsted Sr.'s plan for New York City's Central
Park was, geographically and financially, far more limited than
Olmsted Jr.'s 1930 plan for Los Angeles. Additionally, unlike Olm-
stedJr.'s plan for Los Angeles, Olmsted Sr.'s plan for Central Park
did not need to account for the automobile. Notwithstanding these
differences, however, there is a clear link between the two plans.
100. RBVCZVNSKY, supra note 83, at 177 (quoting from Olmsted Sr.'s comments
presented to the Board of Commissioners of Central Park on May 31, 1858).
101. Id. at 173.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 174.
104. Id. at 173, 176.
105. Interview with Isabel Ruth Kibei, author's mother (Aug. 2001).
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The planning assumptions and landscape objectives remain the
same. Reading the 1930 Olmsted-Bartholomew Park Plan, one hears
echoes of the cadence and substance of Olmsted Sr.'s defense of
Central Park.
B. 1930 Olmsted-Bartholomew Park Plan
The subject of the 1930 Olmsted-Bartholomew Park Plan was all of
Los Angeles, not simply the Los Angeles River. The introduction to
the plan establishes the tone of urgency that permeates the
document:
Among the things that make Los Angeles most attractive are the
very ones that are first to suffer from changes and deteriorate
through neglect. Especially attractive, and especially subject to
destruction, are the opportunities offered in the region for enjoy-
ment of out-of-door life.
But these invaluable assets, now on the verge of disappearing,
can easily be preserved by concerted action. They can, indeed, be
greatly increased by a systematic care on a scale large enough to
match the rapid growth of population. Continued prosperity will
depend on providing needed parks, because, with the growth of a
great metropolis here, the absence of parks will make living con-
ditions less and less attractive, less and less wholesome, though
parks have been easily dispensed with under the conditions of the
past. In so far, therefore, as the people fail to show the under-
standing, courage and organizing ability necessary at this crisis,
the growth of the region will tend to strangle itself. 106
To ward off this strangulation, the 1930 Olmsted-Bartholomew
Park Plan presented a blueprint that addressed the three defining
geographic features of the Los Angeles region: its beaches, its
mountains, and its river. With respect to the beaches, Olmsted and
Bartholomew warned against private encroachment on the public's
right to access and use. 107 For the mountains, Olmsted and Bar-
tholomew cautioned against expansion of residential development
in the canyons and foothills of the Santa Monica, San Gabriel, and
Verdugo ranges. lOB The plan called for zoning and public acquisi-
tion to preserve these existing resources. 109 Yet, the plan's proposal
for the Los Angeles River was its most innovative component.
Unlike with the beaches and the mountains, Olmsted and Bar-
tholomew recognized that the main challenge presented by the
106. HISE & DEVERELL, supra note 77, at 84.
107. [d. at 151-74.
108. [d. at 179-92.
109. [d. at 151-92.
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Los Angeles River was not the preservation of an existing resource.
Rather, the challenge lay in developing land uses alongside the
river to accommodate the river's fluctuating flows and tendencies
to flood. The proposal they came up with was as ingenious as it was
simple: construct a buffer of rolling parkland rising up from the
river's banksYo During most of the year, when the river's flow was
minimal, these rolling, rising hills would serve as public parks.
During those occasions when the river's flow was at its maximum,
the rolling parkland would act as a natural catch-basin to retain the
river's floodwaters until they percolated back into the ground. The
key to this strategy was to discourage and ideally prevent further
construction near the river.
Anticipating the resistance that their proposal would engender,
particularly among those who stood to benefit from the sale and
development of the lands along the river, Olmsted and Bartholo-
mew offered the following economic argument in support of their
river recommendation:
To the experienced eye, the slopes of the land show approxi-
mately where water must concentrate in times of heavy rainfall
.... Because of the innocent look [land along the river] has in
dry weather, it is not as cheap as it ought to be. Between floods
[the land along the river] looks pretty good for building pur-
poses to those who never saw what storm water can do in this
country. Unsuspecting purchasers, victims of their own igno-
rance, will fall in the traps laid for them by the sharp practices of
ruthless promoters, and such lands will be cut up, sold, and occu-
pied. Unfortunately, the burden of such a wrong development
does not fallon the purchaser alone, and scarcely ever on the
vendor, but most heavily on the community at large. There is, of
course, a remedy, but it requires vision and vigor to apply it. lll
They continued:
These are, of course, primarily flood-control and water-conserva-
tion problems; but there are many opportunities for combining
with them, at little extra cost, parks along natural drainage lines
on land relatively cheap, and extensive enough for recreation
purposes. Such land would have to be acquired only once, yet
would serve a double purpose-flood-control use and park use-
not conflicting but positively beneficial to each other. The combi-
nation of parks with flood control necessities is frequently possi-
ble, and wherever practiced it not only will yield a double return
on the investment in land but also may lead to an ampler and
better solution of both problems at a much lower cost of con-
110. Id. at 96-98.
Ill. Id. at 96.
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struction than either would separately pay. 1 12
Olmsted and Bartholomew estimated that the costs of imple-
menting their plan-beaches, mountains, rivers, and all-would
cost $231 million. 1 13 With the onset of the Great Depression, how-
ever, this figure proved too daunting even for the 1930 plan's
strongest supporters. 114
As it turned out, the cost of the United States Army Corps of
Engineers' water freeway far exceeded the cost of Olmsted and
Bartholomew's predicted $231 million plan.1I5 From the perspec-
tive of many Los Angeles residents, however, the water freeway of-
fered a critical advantage over the 1930 plan. While the citizens of
Los Angeles would have to cover the costs incurred by Olmsted and
Bartholomew's plan, the federal government would pay to pave the
river. 11 6
Under these circumstances, the river's fate was sealed. The
1930 Olmsted-Bartholomew Park Plan would remain the path not
taken, and the self-strangulating development warned of in the
plan's introduction would prove a prescient forecast of the Los An-
geles to come. 1l7
C. Los Angeles' Park-Poor Legacy Since 1930
The authors of 1930 Olmsted-Bartholomew Park Plan argued that
without park-focused city planning, Los Angeles would soon lack
adequate parkland, and that the brunt of this inadequacy would be
borne by the city's poorer citizens who lacked the means to travel
elsewhere for open space and recreation. This prediction came to
pass.
Among major cities, Los Angeles has one of the lowest park-
land-to-population ratios in the countryYs Los Angeles has less
112. Id. at 97-98 (emphasis removed).
113. Common Ground, supra note 76, at 13-14.
114. HISE & DEVERELL, supra note 77, at 42-46.
115. GUMPRECHT, supra note 11, at 221-24.
116. MORRISON & LAMONICA, supra note 1, at 78.
117. Common Ground, supra note 76, at 14:
In 1930, L.A. city planners shelved a visionary plan by the son of Central Park
designer Frederick Law Olmsted for a wealth of parks and playgrounds in Los
Angeles. There would be no Central Park, no Golden Gate Park, no Rock Creek
Park in this city. And the residents of Los Angeles have been impoverished ever
since by that monumental lack ofjudgment.
See also Joel R. Reynolds, A Crossroads at the Cornfield, L.A. TIMES, June 20, 2000, at 9.
118. Loomis, supra note 15; Reynolds, supra note 117, at 9 ("Instead of warehouses
and industry, the community coalition has proposed an alternative that would create a
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than five acres of public parkland per thousand people, compared
to the National Recreation and Park Association standard of ten
acres per thousand people.1l9 New York City contains 300 square
feet of public parkland for each person, and in Minneapolis there
are 756 square feet of public parkland for each person.120 There is,
in contrast, only 130 square feet of parkland per person in Los
Angeles.121
Furthermore, the public parkland that does exist in Los Ange-
les is not distributed equally. According to the 2002 Greenprinting
Los Angeles report by the Trust for Public Land (TPL), "in neigh-
borhoods where a majority of the population has a household in-
come less than $25,000 or for which a majority of the population is
non-white, the density of parkland falls to as low as 0.3 acres per
thousand."122
According to a recent article by Robert Garcia, an attorney with
the Center for Law in the Public Interest (CLIPI) in Los Angeles
who represented many of the groups that opposed the Cornfield
reindustrialization project, the city's current park situation is not
simply a consequence of poor city planning:
The fact that low income people of color disproportionately live
in environmentally degraded areas with inadequate access to
parks such as in the Cornfield vicinity is not an accident of un-
planned growth. It is necessary to connect the historical dots. Los
Angeles is the way it is today as a result of a legacy of discrimina-
tory land use planning, restrictive housing covenants, federal
mortgage subsidies restricted to racially homogenous neighbor-
hoods, and discriminatory park funding policies and
practices....
As Garcia notes, this inequity in access to parkland has been
recognized by Los Angeles' political leaders, ranging from former
Los Angeles Mayor Richard Riordan to Dallan Zamrzla, a former
director of planning and development for the Los Angeles Recrea-
tion and Parks Department. Riordan, in an interview with the Wall
Street Journal, stated his belief that "poorer communities in the in-
ner city have been historically short-changed by City funding for-
mulas.... Money is not invested throughout the City based on
badly needed park in a city that has fewer parkland acres per thousand residents than any
major city in the country. ").
119. TRUST FOR PUB. LAND, GREENPRINTING Los ANGELES (2002) [hereinafter GREEN-
PRINTING Los ANGELES].
120. Loomis, supra note 15.
121. [d.
122. GREENPRINTING Los ANGELES, supra note 119.
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need, but is distributed equally among the 15 City Council districts
regardless of need." Zamrzla also cited the unfair effects of "ordi-
nances requir[ing] that parks be developed when housing develop-
ments go in."123 Such rules have the effect of increasing parkland
in new, suburban areas, relative to poor neighborhoods, where lit-
tle construction occurs. 124
The policies and trends noted by Garcia and the TPL have been
further exacerbated by California's Proposition 13, passed in
1978.125 This proposition amended the state constitution to pro-
hibit cities and counties from raising property taxes on a parcel
until the parcel is sold, thereby freezing a parcel's property tax as-
sessment during each ownership period even though the parcel's
appraised value may increase during this period. 126 One of the con-
sequences of Proposition 13 has been a marked reduction in the
tax revenues of California cities and counties and a corresponding
reduction in spending on public services by municipalities. 127
Parks are one of the public services that have suffered under
Proposition 13. Since the proposition's passage, the production of
new urban parks in Los Angeles and throughout California has
fallen, and there are less local public resources available to main-
tain existing parks. 128 These cut-backs, once again, have the great-
est impact on the poorest neighborhoods.129
As noted earlier, in recent years there have been efforts by the
City and County of Los Angeles and the State of California to im-
prove the park situation in Los Angeles. These efforts include Los
Angeles County's adoption of the Los Angeles River Master Plan in
1996, the passage of state legislation creating the RMC in 1999, and
123. Garcia, supra note 5, at 10.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 11; Chinatown Cornfield Administrative Complaint Filed by Chinatown
Yards Alliance with U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development, U.S. Dept. of Com-
merce and U.S. Justice Dept. at 26 (dated Sept. 21, 2000) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Cornfield Federal Administrative Complaint] ("The continuing disparities in access to
parks and recreation programs are a result of the City'S funding formulas which were
adopted in the wake of Prop 13, which cut off local funds for parks and schools in 1978.").
126. PETER SCHRAG, PARADISE LOST: CALIFORNIA'S EXPERIENCE, AMERICA'S FUTURE 14-
16, 139-49 (1998).
127. Id. at 154 ("What the taxpayers gained, the tax collector lost. Overnight, prop-
erty tax revenues for local agencies declined by between $6 and $7 million annually. That
amounted to roughly 27 percent of all revenues for cities, 40 percent of county
revenues.") .
128. Garcia, supra note 5, at 9-11.
129. CENZATTI ET AL., supra note 2, at 90.
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the California State Parks' acquisition of the Cornfield in 2001. 130
These measures can be understood in part as a response to Los
Angeles' park-poor legacy.
IV. HISTORIES OF THE CORNFIELD
Located a stone's-throw from the city's water freeway and close
to the Glendale Narrows, the Cornfield is part of the ecological
history of the Los Angeles River. Beyond river ecology, the Corn-
field is also part of the area's human history. The Cornfield itself,
however, presently offers little physical evidence of the communi-
ties that shaped-and were shaped by-the site.131
By the late 1990s, when the Cornfield re-industrialization pro-
ject took shape, the only permanent structures that remained on-
site were a few scattered, dilapidated metal sheds left over from the
railroad era. 132 The rail lines had been removed in the late
1980s.133 At first glance, there was nothing to suggest that the
Cornfield had ever been anything but a railyard. In fact, when the
City of Los Angeles' Cultural Heritage Department reviewed the
reindustrialization project, it concluded that the site had always
been devoted to railroad use, and that beyond its railroad legacy
the Cornfield had no other historical significance.134 This finding
lent support to those seeking to redevelop the site for manufactur-
ing and warehouse use. However, according to a 2000 report, pre-
pared jointly by the Urban Planning Department of the University
of California at Los Angeles, and Occidental College's Urban and
Environmental Policy Institute (2000 UCLA-Occidental College
Report), the Cultural Heritage Department's conclusion was
deeply flawed:
To fully understand the competing interests on the site and their
justifications for continuing or changing prior uses, the history of
130. See supra notes 9,10, 63, 74, and accompanying text.
131. CENZATTI ET AL., supra note 2, §3 at 23 ("One of the main quandaries with a site
of this type, where no evident physical traces remain, lies in determining how to judge its
historic value.").
132. Summary Appraisal Report of Broadway Frontage Component, River Station
Site/Cornfield, 1030 North Broadway, Los Angeles, California, Prepared for the Trust for
Public Land by CB Richard Ellis, Inc. at 21 (July 25,2001) (on file with author) [hereinaf-
ter Cornfield Appraisal].
133. [d.
134. CENZATTI ET AL., supra note 2, §3 at 58; Cornfield Federal Administrative Com-
plaint, supra note 125, at 30-31 ("The City's Cultural Heritage Department decided that the
Cornfield historically has been used as a rail yard and that there is no historical or cultural
value worth preserving on the Site.").
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Los Angeles' founding and current amnesia about pre-existing
settlement and cultures needs to be revealed. The Cultural Heri-
tage Commission's declaration that the Cornfield site has always
been a rail yard is in keeping with the 'official' history of the City
of Los Angeles, which usually begins with the first defining bout.
of industrialization at the end of the 1800s. However, this view
ignores the area's history prior to Anglo settlement as well as the
stories of the marginalized people who have lived and worked in
the area since. Most importantly, it encompasses a relatively short
time period and a decidedly physical orientation towards history,
focusing largely on physical traces and artifacts. I35
The Cultural Heritage Commission's failure to appreciate the
broader historical significance of the Cornfield helps to explain
why the re-industrialization project's proponents failed to antici-
pate the broad opposition that this project provoked. To under-
stand the origins of the coalition that opposed and eventually
derailed the Cornfield reindustrialization project, the histories of
the people associated with the site must first be examined.
A. Yangna-Gabrielino Histories
As noted above, the area near downtown Los Angeles was the
site of the Gabrielino village, Yangna. The Gabrielinos were named
for Mission San Gabriel, a Spanish mission established nearby in
the late eighteenth century.I36 There is historical uncertainty as to
the name by which the Gabrielinos referred to themselves before
the arrival of the Spanish settlers. I37 Although some believe they
called themselves Tongva, other claim it was Tobikhar or possibly
Kommivert. Some historians question whether they had a name for
themselves at all. I3S
Evidence indicates that indigenous people inhabited the area
near present-day. downtown Los Angeles for more than 9,000
years. I39 When the Spanish arrived in the late eighteenth century,
there were approximately fifty Gabrielino villages in the Los Ange-
les area, with a total estimated population of between 5,000 and
10,000 people. I40 Yangna served as the civic center for the outlying
Gabrielino villages-just as downtown Los Angeles now serves as
135. CENZATrI ET AL., supra note 2, §3 at 34.
136. GUMPRECHT, supra note 11, at 26-27.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. CENZATTI ET AL., supra note 2, §3 at 25.
140. Id.
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the civic center for the city's outlying suburbs. 141 Located in
Yangna was the Council Tree, a massive sycamore under which the
chiefs of the Gabrielino villages gathered.142 Accounts relate that
the Gabrielinos' Council Tree, located near the site on which Los
Angeles City Hall would later be built, was still standing as late as
1835.143
The Gabrielinos were hunters and gathers, and their existence
depended on the river that flowed alongside their villages.144 They
ate the acorns from the oak trees that covered the river's bottom-
lands, the antelope that grazed in the river's floodplain, and the
steelhead trout that spawned in the river's waters.145 The river was
also their drinking-water source.146
The exact location of the village of Yangna has still not been
determined, but the consensus among historians is that the village
was located west of the Los Angeles River, near present-day Union
Station.147 The 2000 UCLA-Occidental College Report considered
the relation between Yangna and the Cornfield, and concluded
that: "The chances that the Gabrielino village of Yangna was lo-
cated on the Cornfields site seems relatively slim, though it seems
reasonable that the village lay very close to it and that the site saw
considerable use as a trail to ford the river."148 Regardless of
whether or not the Cornfield is situated within Yangna-proper, it is
likely that the site was part ofYangna's immediate environs and was
integral to the village's river-related activities.
B. Spanish-Mexican Histories
Spain was the first European nation to lay claim to California,
when the expedition ofJuan Rodriquez Cabrillo landed at San Di-
ego Bay in 1542.149 The Cabrillo expedition, however, did not ven-
ture far inland in its travels along the California coast, and there is
no record that it ever came into contact with any rivers near mod-
ern Los Angeles.150 In 1602, Spanish explorer Sebastian Vizcaino
141. MORRISON & LAMONICA, supra note 1, at 37.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. GUMPRECHT, supra note 11, at 26-27.
145. Id. at 2, 26-27; MORRISON & LAMONICA, supra note 1, at 33-34.
146. GUMPRECHT, supra note 11, at 26-27.
147. Id. at 29.
148. CENZATTI ET AL., supra note 2, §3 at 25.
149. GUMPRECHT, supra note 11, at 35.
150. Id.
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led an expedition to survey the coastline from Acapulco to Ore-
gon, including San Pedro Bay.l5l As was the case with Cabrillo's
expedition, there is no indication that Vizcaino was aware of the
river that flowed across the Los Angeles plain. 152
Spain's discovery of the Los Angeles River and the lands that
adjoined it would wait until 1769. In 1768, the Spanish government
ordered an expedition to set forth from Baja California to occupy
the port at Monterey Bay.153 In the previous century, Vizcaino had
noted Monterey's potential as a harbor. 154 Pursuant to this order
from Spain, the governor of Baja California, Gaspar de Portola, or-
ganized a party to head north. 155 Portola's expedition party in-
cluded engineer Michael Costano and FatherJuan Crespi, and it is
Costano's and Crespi's accounts that provide the first record of
Spanish exploration of the wooded marshlands that lay inland of
San Pedro Bay. 156
On the morning of August 1, 1769, the Portola expedition
rested among dense, low woods in the Los Angeles plain to cele-
brate the jubilee of Nuestra Senora de los Angeles de la Porci-
uncula ("Our Lady of the Angels of Porciuncula"), a plenary
indulgence of the Roman Catholic church named for a small Ital-
ian chapel in which Saint Francis of Assisi allegedly received a di-
vine revelation. 157 Following morning mass, the expedition pressed
on and came to a riverbed. That day Father Juan Crespi wrote
more than a thousand words in his journal, describing the river
and its surrounding terrain as "very large, very green bottomlands,"
with grapevines, roses, and sage in full bloom, and an abundance
of turtle doves, quail, and thrushes. Crespi noted that "to my mind
this spot can be given the preference in everything, in soil, water
and trees, for the purpose of becoming in time a very large plente-
ous mission."158 In honor of the particular day that the Portola ex-
pedition came upon it, the expeditioners took to calling the river
the Rio de Porciuncula. 159
Based in large part on the rapturous reports in Father Juan
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 35-36.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 35.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 37.
158. Id. at 38.
159. Id. at 37.
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Crespi's journal, in 1781 the Spanish authorities authorized the
first governor of California, Felipe de Neve, to establish a mission
and settlement near the Rio de Porciuncula, called El Pueblo de la
Reina de Los Angeles (Pueblo Los Angeles).16o The site selected by
de Neve for the settlement was located one-half mile west of the
river and close to the Glendale Narrows, near the site of the ex-
isting Gabrielino village ofYangna.161 To provide drinking water to
the pueblo and irrigation for its adjacent fields, in October 1781
the Zanja Madre ("mother ditch") was constructed to transport the
water from the Rio de Porciuncula. 162
It is believed that wheat, beans, and maize were the primary
crops planted by the original Spanish-Mexican settlers in Pueblo
Los Angeles. 163 The fertile soil and steady water supply provided by
the river enabled the pueblo to attain economic self-sufficiency by
1786, when the Spanish government's subsidy was discontinued.164
In the decades that followed, the Zanja Madre was expanded
into a comprehensive zanja system-a network of water conveyance
canals. 165 It was this zanja system that formed the basis for Pueblo
Los Angeles' development. 166 The United States seized possession
of California in 1848 following the Mexican-American War. When
United States Army Lieutenant Edward Ord came to Los Angeles
in 1849 to survey the town, he encountered vineyards, orchards,
and gardens extending four miles down the river's banks. 167 As the
United States asserted control over the area, the name Rio de
Porciuncula gave way to the less colorful "Los Angeles River," and
the earthen Zanja Madra and zanja system canals were replaced
with concrete-lined conduits and underground pipes.168
In early 2000, in the midst of the controversy over the proposed
reindustrialization of the Cornfield site, two amateur archaeolo-
gists were digging along the base of the bluffs near North Broad-
way Street.169 Their excavation uncovered remnants of the original
160. [d. at 41-42.
161. [d. at 38.
162. [d. at 43.
163. [d. at 43.
164. [d. at 44-46.
165. CENZATII ET AL., supra note 2, §3 at 30-32.
166. [d.
167. GUMPRECHT, supra note 11, at 55.
168. CENZATII ET AL., supra note 2, §3 at 30-32.
169. Jan Chatten-Brown, Materials Submitted for "The Value of Urban Greenspace:
Lessons from the Los Angeles Cornfield," Panel at the Annual Conference of the Real
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C. Railroad Histories
The Cornfield was also a significant landmark for California's'
early corporate giant, the Southern Pacific Railroad. As recounted
in Frank Norris' infamous 1901 novel, The Octopus, the Southern
Pacific Railroad played a pivotal role in the late nineteenth century
and early twentieth century development of the state. I7l
Southern Pacific came to Los Angeles in 1876.172 The railroad's
main line ran to downtown Los Angeles through the Glendale Nar-
rows, paralleling the east bank of the Los Angeles River. 173 In the
1920s, Southern Pacific's main switching and repair facility, Taylor
Yard, occupied three miles of riverfront land just upriver from the
Cornfield site. I74 At one time Taylor Yard employed more than
10,000 people. I75 Additional switching and maintenance facilities
were located downriver from Taylor Yard at the Cornfield. The
modern Cornfield contains at least three significant historical ves-
tiges from the railroad era.
First, the arrival of the railroads in the city was soon followed by
the construction of several grand bridges across the Los Angeles
River. I76 Although most of these bridges were initially constructed
to carry Southern Pacific rails, many of them later carried street-
cars and automobiles. I77 One of the most spectacular of these
spans is the North Broadway Bridge at the extreme northeast edge
of the Cornfield. The North Broadway Bridge; completed in 1912,
is a monumental Beaux Arts work designed by renowned Los Ange-
les architect Alfred F. Rosenheim.I 78 The Bureau of Engineering of
the Los Angeles City Department of Public Works recently oversaw
the bridge's retrofit and restoration, and determined that the
structure was eligible for listing on the National Registry of Historic
Property Law Section of the State Bar of California (Apr. 27, 2002) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Chatten-Brown Materials].
170. Id.
171. FRANK NORRIS, THE O=oPus: A STORY OF CALIFORNIA (1901).




176. Califamia Historic Preservation Awards, ARCHITE=URE WK., Mar. 28, 2001, at N3
[hereinafter Architecture Week Article].
177. Id.
178. Id.
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Places. 179 In 2001, the North Broadway Bridge retrofit and restora-
tion effort was recognized in an award by the California Preserva-
tion Society. In an article on the award ceremony, Architecture Week
magazine noted that at one time the North Broadway Bridge was
known as the "gateway" to the city. ISO
Second, in the early 1930s, the city approved the plan for Los
Angeles' Union Station to be constructed at a site located in the
city's original Chinatown. lSI To make way for Union Station, which
was completed in 1939, the original Chinatown structures were de-
molished and Chinatown's population was forcibly relocated to its
current location, which is adjacent to and overlooking the Corn-
field. Is2 Moreover, it should also be remembered that it was largely
Chinese workers that constructed the Southern Pacific railroad in
Los Angeles and throughout California. Is3 The history of Southern
California's railroads and the Cornfield is therefore closely inter-
twined with the history of the Chinese residents of Los Angeles.
Thirdly, the railroad uses at the Cornfield site resulted in the
release of hazardous substances into the soil. For instance, one
area of the site had contained a building called the Oil House
where barrels of diesel and other heavy-metal fuels such as journal
box oil were stored. Is4 Recent subsurface testing confirmed the
presence of petroleum hydrocarbons in the soils beneath the for-
mer Oil House site. Is5 The history of the Southern Pacific railroad
is therefore also a part of the Cornfield's legacy of environmental
contamination. The cost of the cleanup associated with this con-
tamination was a critical issue in the subsequent controversy over
whether the site could or should be redeveloped as urban
parkland.
D. Current Community Histories
An understanding of the demographics of the neighborhoods
that presently surround the Cornfield is also essential to under-
standing the larger debate over the site.
179. Los Angeles Bureau of Eng'g, North Broadway Viaduct over the Los Angeles River, at
http://eng.lacity.org/projects.bridge/br_bw.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2004).
180. Architecture Week Article, supra note 176.
181. Garcia, supra note 5, at 12-15.
182. Id.
183. See generally NORRIS, supra note 171; STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, NOTHING LIKE IT IN
THE WORLD: THE MEN WHO BUILT THE TRANSCONTINENTAL RAILROAD 1863-1869 (2000).
184. CENZATTI ET AL., supra note 2, §3 at 44.
185. Id. .
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The 2000 UCLA-Occidental College Report on the Cornfield
noted that in 1989,91% of the population within a two-mile radius
of the site had a median household income below that of Los An-
geles County.186 Within this same two-mile radius, over 30% of the
households were below the poverty line, as compared with 18.9%
for the rest of the City of Los Angeles. 187
The UCLA-Occidental College Report also provided an analysis
of the population of the census tract (2071) and zip code (90012)
closest to the Cornfield.188 For census tract 2071, it found that
Asians/Pacific Islanders, Hispanics, and Mrican-Americans collec-
tively accounted for 97% of the population, and that for zip code
90012 Asians/Pacific Islanders, Hispanics and Mrican-Americans
collectively accounted for 86% of the population.189 These same
ethnic groups collectively constituted 69% of the City of Los
Angeles. 190
The UCLA-Occidental College Report also found that, for per-
sons over the age of 25, 54% of those living in census tract 2071
and 27% of those living in zip code 90012 had an education level
below the ninth grade. Fourteen percent of those living in census
tract 2071 and 20% of those living in zip code 90012 had gradu-
ated from high school. Only 3% of those living in census tract 2071
and 7% of those living in zip code 90012 had a college bachelor's
degree. 19l These levels of education are far below the median for
the City of Los Angeles. 192
These statistics reveal that, as compared with the rest of the city,
the communities surrounding the Cornfield are disproportionately
poor, disproportionately people of color, and possess dispropor-
tionately low levels of formal education. Beyond these broad statis-
tics, however, the particular ethnic groups that predominate in the
area near the Cornfield have their own unique histories of discrim-
ination. These histories help to explain these groups' particular
connections to the Cornfield site and the particular perspectives
they brought and continue to bring to the debate over what the
site should be.
For the downtown Chinese community, the destruction of Los
186. [d. at 91.
187. [d.
188. [d. at 87.
189. [d.
190. Garcia, supra note 5, at 10.
191. CENZATTI ET AL., supra note 2, §3 at 90.
192. [d.
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Angeles' initial Chinatown to make way for Union Station remains
a defining experience. As Robert Garcia of CLIPI recounts in his
description of this episode:
Some residents refused to move out even when the utilities
ceased to exist and when the pavement was uprooted. Demolition
commenced on December 22, 1933. The first building razed was
a children's school. Soon the remnants of the vegetable market
were destroyed. Chinese residents plucked the last vegetables
from their disappearing gardens while others slowly plodded
away from their quickly wrecked homes with their cooking uten-
sils and their few other belongings in shopping bags. Some re-
sidents scattered to other enclaves while others lingered for years
watching their community crumble around them. The City Mu-
nicipal Housing Commission did not even approve a plan to relo-
cate Chinatown until weeks after the demolition started. 193
Many of the refugees from Los Angeles' initial Chinatown
moved to the designated relocation site, an area of vacant Santa Fe
Railroad land above North Broadway Street. 194 Here they worked
to rebuild their community, to create a new neighborhood for Chi-
nese families and a new city-wide focal point for Chinese culture.
As today's Chinatown residents looked out on the vacant Cornfield
railyard from the North Broadway Street bluffs, with Union Station
visible across the yard from this vantage point, they envisioned
something other than a manufacturing-warehouse complex. They
envisioned a place that would beautify and strengthen their
neighborhood.
For the Hispanic community in the Lincoln Heights and So-
lano Canyon neighborhoods close to the Cornfield, a defining ex-
perience was the demolition of the Chavez Ravine neighborhood.
Chavez Ravine, located adjacent to Elysian Park above present-day
Chinatown, was a working class, Mexican-American residential
community.195 The City of Los Angeles, however, forcibly relocated
the citizens of Chavez Ravine in the 1950s to build Dodger Stadium
for the baseball team that moved to Los Angeles from Brooklyn.196
Chavez Ravine's dislocated residents had been promised new, fed-
erally financed housing, but this housing was never built.197 Today
the rolling hills surrounding Chavez Ravine's former residences
193. Garcia, supra note 5, at 14.
194. [d.
195. See generally DON NORMARK, CHAVEZ RAVINE, 1949: A Los ANGELES STORY (1999).
196. [d. at 21.
197. [d. at 20.
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are blanketed with the stadium's immense asphalt parking lot,19g
The broken promises and lost landscapes associated with Chavez
Ravine provide the historical context for the Hispanic community's
determination to reclaim the Cornfield.
For Mrican-Americans who live near the Cornfield in the Wil-
liam Mead Homes and the Boyle Heights neighborhood, there is
also a long legacy of discrimination, especially in the housing sec-
tor. Between 1910 and 1920, the Mrican-American population of
Los Angeles doubled. 199 This influx was met with a hostile response
by many of the city's white citizens, who began recording restrictive
racial covenants to block the sale of homes or rental of apartments
to Mrican-Americans.200 As a consequence, by 1920 the city's Mri-
can-American residents were concentrated in, or perhaps more ac-
curately contained within, four primary areas: Boyle Heights in East
Los Angeles; the Westside on Jefferson Boulevard between Nor-
mandie and Western Avenues; the Temple Street settlement north-
west of downtown, between Alvarado and Hoover Avenues; and the
Furlong Tract, a few blocks east of Central Avenue between Fifty-
First and Fifty-Fifth Streets.201
As the 1998 book Central Avenue Sounds.jazz in Los Angeles notes:
"While the expanding white populations fanned out throughout
the Los Angeles Basin, blacks were forced to move into the existing
communities.... Black renters and homeowners were increasingly
met by walls of white resistance.''202 Although these restrictive racial
housing covenants were held illegal soon after World War II, the
vestiges of the period when these covenants were enforceable re-
main evident today.203 This history helps to explain why many Mri-
can-American residents living near the Cornfield continue to
experience a certain disconnectedness from Los Angeles and its
history. It also explains why the prospect of reclaiming the Corn-
field as parkland was perceived by these residents as an opportunity
to reconnect.
198. [d. at 76.
199. CENTRAL AVENUE SOUNDS: JAZZ IN Los ANGELES 7 (Clora Bryant et al. eds., 1998).
200. [d. at 7-8.
201. Id. at 7.
202. Id. at 8.
203. Id. at 7.
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V. REINDUSTRIALIZING THE CORNFIELD: RESISTANCE IN THE
COMMUNIlY AND THE COURTS
In March of 1999, Los Angeles Mayor Richard Riordan intro-
duced his "Genesis LA" economic incentive program.204 Genesis
LA was designed to redevelop blighted industrial sites in the city.205
Within months of the launch of Genesis LA, it was announced that
Majestic Realty would be purchasing the Cornfield from Union Pa-
cific Railroad to build a new manufacturing and warehouse com-
plex called River Station (the name of the former Southern Pacific
railyard depot located on the site) .206 Majestic Realty is the largest
owner and developer of commercial space in Los Angeles
County.207
The proposed River Station complex consisted of four build-
ings totaling 909,200 square feet of light manufacturing and indus-
trial space.208 The thirty-two level acres of the Cornfield would be
paved over by Majestic Realty, and the eight acres of steep bluff
along North Broadway would remain pavement-free and available
as a community park.209
Genesis LA's and Majestic Realty's redevelopment plans for the
Cornfield, however, appear to have been formulated without an
understanding of the communities and politics surrounding the
site. These plans did not account for the fact that for many years
prior to 1999 there had been a growing movement to reclaim
downtown lands adjacent to the Los Angeles River as open space to
benefit both the river's ecology and the nearby communities. The
Cornfield site figured prominently in these downtown open-space/
river-restoration initiatives. This placed the reindustrialization pro-
posal on a collision course with environmentalists and many nearby
residents. If Mayor Riordan's office and Majestic Reality were genu-
inely surprised by the forceful and broad-based opposition to the
River Station project, they should not have been.210
204. CENZAITI ET AL., supra note 2, §3 at 2.
205. fd. at 3.
206. fd.; Cornfield State Park Advisory Committee, A Unified Vision for Cornfield
State Park 3 (Apr. 2003) (report presented to the Director of California State Parks) (on
file with author) [hereinafter Unified Vision].
207. CENZATTI ET AL., supra note 2, §3 at 2-3.
208. Chatten-Brown & Delvac, supra note 3, at 4.
209. Chatten-Brown Materials, supra note 169.
210. William Delvac, Remarks at "The Value of Urban Greenspace: Lessons Learned
from the Los Angeles Cornfield," Panel at the Annual Conference of Real Property Law
Section of State Bar of California (Apr. 27, 2002) (transcript on file with author) [hereinaf-
ter Delvac Remarks]:
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A. An Alternative Vision for the Cornfield Takes Hold
As noted above, in 1998 FoLAR (Friends of the Los Angeles
River), the Sierra Club, and the Urban Resources Partnership or-
ganized The River Through Downtown conference.21I The report pre-
pared for and distributed at the conference set forth land-use
proposals for several downtown areas located adjacent or close to
the Los Angeles River. The report was the result of a series of meet-
ings and workshops held in riverside downtown neighborhoods.212
An entire section of the report was devoted to a tract of abandoned
railroad land identified as the "Chinatown Yards" or the "Cornfield
Railyard."213 Below is the vision for the Cornfield presented at The
River Through Downtown conference:
Envision a new urban neighborhood linking Chinatown and the
Los Angeles River where residential, office and retail uses over-
look a large park. Picnic areas under the trees, soccer fields, soft-
ball diamonds, and new middle school serve Chinatown, Lincoln
Heights, and a new neighborhood called River Park. Along the
edge of the park, the Zanja Madre or "Mother Canal," follows an
alignment closely parallel to the historic canal that carried water
from the river to sustain the old Los Angeles pueblo. Beginning
at the base of Elysian Park, the canal runs along to the slope be-
low North Broadway. A bikeway follows the canal, and new hous-
ing, climbing up the slope, overlooks the park. The park and the
adjoining residential development have replaced abandoned rail-
road yards, while the Blue Line to Pasadena runs behind the
housing.
A series of pools and fountains extends the new zanja, under
densely planted trees, along the edge of a redesigned Alameda
Street, with the bicycle path continuing alongside. Opposite
Union Station, channels, including a flume, or raised channel,
across the 101 Freeway, extend to a grand fountain east of City
Hall.
[W]hen I came to this project, my client saw a site that had tremendous opportu-
nities and tremendous obstacles, but that had oveIWheiming, almost unanimous
from their view, believe it or not, political support. In fact the first call I got on
this was: 'We've got an extremely easy project for you; no one objects to this pro-
ject, everyone supports it. The Mayor's office is going to expedite it, the council
office is going to expedite it, there are no environmental issues, there is no com-
munity opposition. All we need you to do is take a look at this little Mitigate Neg
Dec and make sure we're on track.
211. The River Through Downtown, supra note 64, at 5.
212. !d.
213. [d. at 7.
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From there, water features continue eastward to the Japanese Na-
tional Museum and the Temporary Contemporary, commemorat-
ing the historic irrigated fields between the original town and the
river.214
The land-use ideas proposed for the Cornfield at the 1998 The
River Through Downtown conference were somewhat different than
the Cornfield park planning ideas being discussed today. As com-
pared with current park plans, The River Through Downtown confer-
ence proposed using part of the site for housing and a new middle
school. These differences notwithstanding, it was evident that by
1998 environmentalists and neighborhoods near the Cornfield
were beginning to view the site as more than just a parcel of pri-
vate, former industrial land for sale. They were beginning to be-
lieve that the site could and should be reclaimed for a variety of
public purposes-including parkland, river restoration, housing
and education-and that a broader public dialogue was needed to
determine its future.
B. Majestic Realty's River Station Reindustrialization Project
When Mayor Riordan's Genesis LA project was launched in
early 2000, the Cornfield was a weed-filled expanse, strewn with
building debris and rusting metal and makeshift encampments for
the homeless.215 The site had been in this condition for nearly a
decade, during which time no economically viable redevelopment
proposal had surfaced. Faced with these circumstances, from the
city's perspective, Majestic Realty's reindustrialization project ap-
peared to offer several advantages.
First, the site was already zoned for industrial use. Therefore,
Majestic Realty's plans did not require any land-use variances or
zoning changes.216 The only discretionary approval required for
Majestic Realty's project would be the city's review of the site
plan.217 In contrast, for uses such as housing, parkland, or schools,
additional planning department reports and public hearings would
be needed, as the city considered whether to grant the needed vari-
ances. These anticipated reports and hearings could result in de-
lays and uncertainty.
214. Id. at 21.
215. Chatten-Brown & Delvac, supra note 3, at 3-4.
216. Id. at 4.
217. Los ANGELES CAL. CODE § 16.05 (1990).
2004] LOS ANGELES' CORNFIELD 311
Second, because the environmental cleanup standards for
schools, housing, and parkland are higher than the standards for
industrial/warehouse sites, the cost of remediating the Cornfield's
subsurface contamination was likely to be considerably less if the
site's end uses were those proposed in Majestic Realty'S plan rather
than those set forth in The River Through Downtown report.218 More-
over, if Majestic Realty redeveloped the Cornfield, then presuma-
bly Majestic Realty would be responsible for the environmental
remediation costs. If, on the other hand, the City of Los Angeles
acquired the Cornfield for a park or school, then presumably the
City of Los Angeles might have to pay for the cleanup.219
Third, Majestic Realty's proposal offered the prospect of tangi-
ble, short-term economic benefits. There appeared to be a high
demand for additional industrial and warehouse space in the vicin-
ity of downtown Los Angeles. The prospects for the financial suc-
cess of the River Station complex therefore looked good.220
Majestic Realty had also estimated that the River Station facility
could create as many as 1,000 jobs, some of which might go to
nearby residents. 221
Finally, in addition to the significant financial assets that Majes-
tic Realty would bring to the table, the River Station project had
also managed to secure an $11.75 million commitment from the
United States Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD).222 More specifically, in August 1999 HUD Secretary An-
drew Cuomo announced that, in order to support Majestic Realty's
Cornfield redevelopment proposal, HUD would provide a $1.25
million grant under its Brownfield Economic Development Initia-
tive to help cover environmental cleanup costs and another $10.5
million in loan guarantees.223
In light of these perceived advantages, Mayor Riordan's office
218. CENZATTI ET AL., supra note 2, §3 at 129:
Its [sic] seems the economics of a brownfields site is its own worst enemy. The
costs of remediation rise with the more public of a use of a property. Building
box-type manufacturing is more beneficial for the City in terms of both tax reve-
nue and remediation costs, as opposed to putting in a park or building a school,
which could be financially confiscatory for the City to bear on its own.
219. Interview with Lewis MacAdams, Cofounder and Chair of the Board of Direc-
tors, FoLAR, during visit to Cornfield site (July 2001) [hereinafter Interview with Lewis
MacAdams].
220. Chatten-Brown & Delvac, supra note 3, at 5.
221. Jd.
222. CENZATTI ET AL., supra note 2, §3 at 125.
223. Jd.
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moved quickly to expedite approval of the River Station project.224
Under California law, all state and local agencies must comply with
the requirements of the California Environmental Quality Act
(CEQA) when granting discretionary approval of a project.225
Under CEQA-, if there is a fair argument that there is substantial
evidence in the administrative record that discretionary approval
of a project may result in a significant adverse impact on the envi-
ronment, then an environmental impact report (EIR) must be pre-
pared by the agency authorized to make the approva1.226 An EIR
prepared under CEQA is similar in scope and substance to an envi-
ronmental impact statement (EIS) prepared pursuant to the fed-
eral National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) .227
If a fair argument cannot be made that there is substantial evi-
dence in the administrative record that discretionary approval of a
project may result in a significant adverse impact on the environ-
ment, then the agency can avoid preparing an EIR and instead
adopt a document called a Negative Declaration ("Neg Dec").228 A
Neg Dec that includes mitigation measures that reduce the adverse
environmental impact of a project so that an EIR is not required is
referred to as a Mitigated Neg Dec.229
As mentioned above, the only discretionary City of Los Angeles
approval for the River Station project involved review of the site
plan. On May 23, 2000, the Director of the City of Los Angeles
Planning Department approved the Cornfield site plan submitted
by Majestic Realty and adopted an accompanying Mitigated Neg
Dec.230
On June 6, 2000, the Planning Department's decision to adopt
a Mitigated Neg Dec instead of requiring preparation of an EIR
was appealed by FoLAR and other groups to Los Angeles' Central
224. [d. at 126:
The Mayor's Office of Economic Development is firmly committed to the idea of
the 32-acre River Station Industrial Park. They have expended time and money in
developing this project and want to see it through .... The City has a developer,
funding-there are no other proposals lined up that would serve this site as com-
pared to the one that is currently proposed.
225. See generally CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 21,000-21,177 (West 2004).
226. See MICHAEL H. REMY ET AL., GUIDE TO THE CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL QUALI'IY
ACT 206 (1999).
227. [d. at 1; see also generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(f) (2000).
228. REMY ET AL., supra note 226, at 1.
229. [d. at 244-49.
230. Delvac Remarks, supra note 210; see also Los Angeles Planning Department MND
99-0319 SPR.
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Area Planning Commission.231 On July 25, 2000, the Central Area
Planning Commission heard and voted to deny the appeal.232
On August 8, 2000, pursuant to Section 245 of the City of Los
Angeles Charter, Los Angeles City Councilmember Mike Her-
nandez made a successful motion for the City Council to assert ju-
risdiction over the question of whether the city should adopt a
Mitigated Neg Dec or require preparation of an EIR in connection
with approval of the site plan for the River Station project.233 On
August 15, 2000, the Los Angeles City Council voted to approve
adoption of a Mitigated Neg Dec that contained some minor addi-
tional mitigation measures.234 With this act, the City Council re-
moved the last administrative roadblock to Majestic Realty's
Cornfield reindustrial-ization plan.
C. Political Opposition by the Chinatown Yards Alliance
Opposition to Majestic Realty's River Station project was led by
the network of organizations that coalesced to form the Chinatown
Yards Alliance.235 Its members included more than thirty organiza-
tions that collectively represented a broad spectrum of stakehold-
ers and communities interested in the fate of the Cornfield. These
included, among others, the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent As-
sociation of Los Angeles, Concerned Citizens of South Central Los
Angeles, Friends of the Los Angeles River, Latino Urban Forum,
Lincoln Heights Neighborhood Preservation Association, Los An-
geles County Bicycle Coalition, Mothers of East Los Angeles-Santa
Isabel, and William Mead Homes Residents Association.236
The litigation pursued by certain member organizations of the




235. Chatten-Brown & Delvac, supra note 3, at 4; Garcia, supra note 5, at 8-10.
236. Chatten-Brown Materials, supra note 169. Listed members of the Chinatown
Yards Alliance included the following organizations and individuals: Ad Hoc Committee
for Safe Children; Chinatown-Alpine Hill Neighborhood Association; Chinese-American
Citizen's Alliance; Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association; Citizens Committee to
Save Elysian Park; Coalition L.A. 1st District Organizing Committee; Coalition of Essential
Schools; Coalition for Clean Air; Concerned Citizens of South Central Los Angeles; Con-
stance L. Rice and The Advancement Project; Echo Park Community Coordinating Coun-
cil; Elysian Heights Residents Association; Environmental Defense; Friends of Castelar
School; Friends of the Los Angeles River; Heal the Bay; Latino Urban Forum; Lincoln
Heights Neighborhood Preservation Association; Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy;
Los Angeles County Bicycle Coalition; William Mead Homes Residents Association; Maria
Elena Durazo; Mothers of East Los Angeles-Santa Isabel; Natural Resources Defense Coun-
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Chinatown Yards Alliance is discussed in greater detail below. This
litigation, however, was only one manifestation of the multifaceted
role that the Chinatown Yards Alliance played in efforts to prevent
reindustrialization of the Cornfield.
One of the first acts of the Chinatown Yard Alliance was to issue
a declaration, signed and endorsed by all of its members, setting
forth its position regarding the River Station project in particular
and the Cornfield in general. This concise, four-paragraph declara-
tion served as a cornerstone of the Chinatown Yards Alliance's ef-
forts to generate political support and media attention. The
declaration, in its entirety, provided:
We, the undersigned central city organizations, representing
neighbors in Chinatown, Lincoln Heights, the William Mead
Homes and around Elysian Park, as well as environmental groups
working in the Los Angeles River corridor, reject Majestic Realty's
attempt to build nearly a million square feet of warehouse on 32
acres of the Cornfields, the old railroad yards between Chinatown
and the Los Angeles River. Better alternatives exist.
We urge the City of Los Angeles to take advantage of the
once-in-a-eentury opportunity the closing of the rail-yard offers to
support a plan to build a middle and high school, sportsfields, a
park, and a bikeway in a community where are none, and much
needed-housing.
We believe the award, without public discussion, of nearly 14
million dollars in Federal H.U.D. brownfields clean-up funds to
help one of the largest developers in Southern California buy the
property is an unwise, inappropriate, and unfair misuse of public
funds. Majestic Realty's proposal promises jobs but guarantees
only more congestion, more air and noise pollution, and more
blight in our communities.
It is time for all interested parties to focus attention on a more
constructive use of this site. We look forward to working with the
L.A. Unified School District, the City and County of Los Angeles,
the State of California and the Federal government to develop a
project in the Chinatown Yards that strengthens our central city
communities, and creates a better place for all of us to live.237
Member organizations of the Chinatown Yards Alliance also re-
tained legal counsel to file an administrative complaint with the
Secretaries of the United States Housing and Urban Development
Department (HUD) and Commerce Department, and the head of
cil; Northeast Renaissance Corp; Northeast Trees; People for Parks; Sierra Club; Southern
California Council on Environment and Development; and TreePeople.
237. Id.
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the Civil Rights Division of the United States Department of Jus-
tice.238 The legal team that drafted this administrative complaint
included Jan Chatten-Brown of Chatten-Brown & Associates, Rob-
ert Garcia (initially with Environmental Defense and later with
CLIPI) , Joel Reynolds of Natural Resources Defense Council
(NRDC), and Lew Hollman of CLIPI.239
The essence of the sixty-five-page administrative complaint,
filed on September 21, 2000, on behalf of FoLAR, the Chinese
Consolidated Benevolent Association of Los Angeles, Concerned
Citizens of South Central Los Angeles, Latino Urban Forum, Natu-
ral Resources Defense Council, and the Northeast Renaissance
Corporation, was that the federal government's financial support
for the River Station project violated federal civil rights and envi-
ronmental justice laws.24o In particular, the administrative com-
plaint alleged violations of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(Title VI),241 the HUD regulations implementing Title VI,242 and
the 1994 Executive Order on Environmental Justice.243
Below are excerpts from the some of the allegations set forth in
the Administrative Complaint:
Communities of color and low-income communities bear a dis-
proportionate share of the environmental degradation in the
Cornfield area, their health and environment would further be
adversely impacted by the Warehouse Project, they would not re-
ceive an equitable share of the benefits of the Project, and they
have been excluded from the decision-making ~rocesses that af-
fect their lives and the future of the Cornfield. 44
The siting of the Warehouse Project causes an adverse disparate
impact by perpetuating the history and pattern of unequal access by
people of color and low-income communities to parks and recre-
ation programs, playgrounds, and schools in the Cornfield area,
in City Council District 1, and throughout Los Angeles.245
The siting of the Warehouse Project will cause adverse disparate
impacts on public safety from increased traffic congestion in and
238. Cornfield Federal Administrative Complaint, supra note 125.
239. Jd. at 65.
240. Jd. at 6, 9-12.
241. 42 V.S.c. § 2000(d) (2000).
242. 24 C.F.R. §1.7 (2004); 24 C.F.R. § 91.05 (2004).
243. Exec. Order No. 12,898, reprinted in 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 16, 1994).
244. Cornfield Federal Administrative Complaint, supra note 125, at 20.
245. Jd. at 25 (emphasis added).
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around the site. The children at Ann Street Elementary School
adjacent to the William Mead Homes in particular would face ad-
ditional traffic safety risks associated with hundreds of truck trips
to and from the Warehouse Pr~ect during the day at the site
entrance adjacent to the school. 46
The Warehouse Project is an eyesore to say the least. The con-
struction and operation of nearly 1 million square feet of ware-
houses with 40-foot high tilt up walls would adversely impact the
aesthetic experience of the residents or and visitors to China-
town, Solano Canyon, Lincoln Heights and William Mead. They
will have to view 32 acres of warehouses, trucks, cars, and parking
10ts.247
Respondents seek to pave over the contamination on the site and
leave it for future generations to clean up when the warehouses
come down. Contaminated brownfields are disproportionately lo-
cated in communities of color and low income communities.
These communities have the right to have the Cornfield cleaned
up now and to the highest standards.248
In response to the administrative complaint and other efforts
by the Chinatown Yards Alliance to promote an alternative vision
for the Cornfield, former HUD Secretary Andrew Cuomo an-
nounced during a visit to Los Angeles in late September 2000 that
he would not release the $11.75 million HUD package for the
River Station project until an EIS was prepared pursuant to
NEPA,249 Because the NEPA process for preparation of an EIS gen-
erally takes at least a year and often much longer, Secretary
Cuomo's decision effectively placed the HUD grant-loan package
out of reach of the City of Los Angeles and Majestic Realty for the
near term and placed the long-term availability of this package into
question as well.
In addition to the administrative complaint, Secretary Cuomo's
decision to withdraw HUD's funding was also due in part to the
efforts of Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., a senior environmental attorney
with NRDC's New York office.250 Cuomo is married to Robert F.
Kennedy,Jr.'s sister. At the request ofJoel Reynolds ofNRDC's Los
246. Id. at 30.
247. Id. at 31-32.
248. Id. at 34.
249. Garcia, supra note 5, at 5.
250. Email from Joel Reynolds, Natural Resources Defense Council, to Paul Kibei
(Dec. 2, 2003) (on file with author).
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Angeles office, in June 2000 Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. contacted his
brother-in-law and discussed the Chinatown Yards Alliance's con-
cerns regarding the proposed River Station project.251 According
to Joel Reynolds, absent Robert F. Kennedy, Jr.'s direct access to
Cuomo, it is unlikely that HUD's headquarters in Washington,
D.C. would have intervened in a funding decision that would ordi-
narily have been entrusted to HUD's Los Angeles office.252 The
Chinatown Yards Alliance's ability to gain access and results at this
high political level caught Majestic Realty off-guard.253
At a panel organized by the California State Bar in April 2002,
William Delvac (the attorney representing Majestic Realty in the
Cornfield matter) was asked what role the loss of the $11.75 mil-
lion grant-loan package played in his client's view of the proposed
River Station project. Delvac responded:
I don't believe that in my client's view the HUD funding was ever
a critical piece of this. But what was critically important about
HUD requiring an EIS under NEPA is that this is when Majestic
Realty finally fully realized that no matter what it did or what ap-
proval it got, every other step of the way there would be another
skirmish, another battle, another front and that if they went into
trial court there would be an appeal. If they got the HUD funding
there would be an EIS, and if they did an EIS there would be
litigation on the EIS.... The endless stream of opposition, even
if you can predict ad seratim victory-just going through that
process year after year drives down the value of the project.254
Beyond its role in convincing HUD to pull its funding for the
River Station project until an EIS was prepared, the Chinatown
Yards Alliance also made headway in bringing key politicians
around to its position.255 Although Los Angeles Mayor Riordan re-
mained steadfast in his support for Majestic Realty's reindustrializa-
tion plans, Speaker of the State Assembly (and subsequent mayoral
candidate for the City of Los Angeles) Antonio Villaraigosa and
influential State Senator Richard Polanco (from Los Angeles) were
persuaded to voice their support for the preparation of an EIR that
would consider the park alternative.256 Villaraigosa's and Polanco's
public support raised the political profile of the Cornfield contro-




254. Delvac Remarks, supra note 210.
255. Chatten-Brown Materials, supra note 169.
256. ld.
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of articles and editorials on the dispute that were sympathetic to
the concerns and aspirations of the Chinatown Yards Alliance.257
D. River Station Lawsuit and September 2000 Settlement Agreement
With the Los Angeles City Council's approval of the design plan
and adoption of the Mitigated Neg Dec on August 15, 2000, oppo-
nents of Majestic Realty's reindustrialization project had exhausted
their administrative remedies. Their only recourse now lay with the
courts. On September 6, 2000, therefore, the opponents filed a pe-
tition for writ of mandate against the City of Los Angeles in Los
Angeles County Superior Court, with Majestic Realty and River Sta-
tion LLC named as real parties-in-interest.258 The named petition-
ers were FoLAR, the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Society of
Los Angeles, Concerned Citizens of South Central Los Angeles, En-
vironmental Defense, the Latino Urban Forum, NRDC, and the
Northeast Renaissance Corporation.259
The heart of the petition was the allegation that the City of Los
Angeles had violated CEQA by adopting the Mitigated Neg Dec
instead of requiring preparation of an EIR in connection with its
review and approval of the site design plan submitted by Majestic
Realty for the River Station project.
The Court's resolution of the petitioners' allegation was likely
to hinge on two points of contention. First, there were differing
views on the scope of Los Angeles Municipal Code (LAMC) Sec-
tion 16.05, which sets forth the issues that should be addressed in a
site design plan.260 Second, there were differing views on whether
the petitioners had introduced sufficient evidence in the adminis-
trative record before the City of Los Angeles (acting through its
City Council and Planning Department) to establish that there was
a fair argument that the administrative record contained substan-
tial evidence that approval of the site design plan may have a po-
tentiallyadverse environmental impact.261
According to Jan Chatten-Brown, one of the attorneys repre-
senting the petitioners:
[W] e believed absolutely ... that we were going to be successful




260. Chatten-Brown & Delvac, supra note 3, at 5.
261. Id.
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ger for requiring an EIR is very low. It is simply whether there is
substantial evidence to support a fair argument that there may be
a significant adverse environmental impact, and we didn't believe
that any judge could find a large, industrial development that
would have hundreds of thousands of trucks attracted to it each
year, adjacent to residential communities would not have a signif-
icant impact.262
William Delvac, the attorney representing Majestic Reality, how-
ever, held a much different view of how the court would likely ap-
proach CEQA's application to LAMC Section 16.05:
Site plan review in the city of Los Angeles is intended to be a
relatively minor discretionary process that triggers environmental
review under CEQA and ensures appropriate site develop-
ment.... It is not intended, nor is it the appropriate process, to
change zoning, limit the uses permitted under existing zoning or
to require an alternate land use.... [Petitioners] were arguing to
the City that it should require a different land use under site plan
review and that an EIR should be prepared, if for no other reason
than to explore atternatives.263
The hearing on the petition was set for early November of
2000.264 In the weeks prior to the hearing date, the parties moved
forward with the legal briefing of their respective positions.265 Dur-
ing this same pre-hearing period, however, Majestic Realty's coun-
sel William Delvac began to discuss an innovative settlement
proposal with his client and the petitioners.266 This proposal
amounted to a coin-toss with a winner-take-all outcome. Under this
proposal, the litigation would be stayed before the hearing, and
petitioners would be provided with a one-year option period to
pull together the funds for the purchase of the Cornfield.267 If the
petitioners were not able to secure the acquisition funds within this
period, the petitioners would dismiss (with prejudice) their peti-
tion and cease all legal opposition to Majestic Realty's project.268
262. Jan Chatten-Brown, Remarks at "The Value of Urban Greenspace: Lessons from
the Los Angeles Cornfield," Panel at the Annual Conference of the Real Property Law
Section of the State Bar of California (Apr. 27, 2002) (transcript on file with author) [here-
inafter Chatten-Brown Remarks].
263. Chatten-Brown & Delvac, supra note 3, at 5.
264. Chatten-Brown Remarks, supra note 262.
265. Chatten-Brown & Delvac, supra note 3, at 5. Although the referenced article was
co-authored by Chatten-Brown and Delvac, the article contained separate sections setting
forth the plaintiffs' and the real party-in-interest's perspectives on this litigation. These two
sections of the article were drafted separately, and respectively, by Chatten-Brown and
Delvac. The portions of the article cited in this footnote were drafted by Delvac.
266. Id. at 6.
267. Id.
268. Id.
320 STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 23:275
As William Delvac recounted at the April 2002 California State
Bar conference:
I went to [petitioners' counsel] and I said that the best outcome
you'll get when you win the litigation is more litigation later. See,
you can litigate and you can litigate, but you're never going to get
a chance to buy the property. Here's the one time and only one
time where we can make something happen, that you get not just
a litigation victo~~> but the result you really want which is the dif-
ferent land use.2 9
From the petitioners' perspective, this coin toss proposal
presented a great opportunity but was fraught with risks. The peti-
tioners themselves did not have the financial means to purchase
the Cornfield.270 As they considered this settlement option, a ques-
tion for petitioners was therefore whether they could identity an-
other buyer who was committed to the park alternative and who
could be relied upon to step forward with the acquisition funds
within the one-year option period.
In early November 2000, the petitioners surveyed the prospects
for raising the necessary acquisition funds and concluded that the
prospects were good.271 This assessment was based in large part on
two considerations.
First, in March 2000, California voters passed Proposition 12.272
Among other things, Proposition 12 made approximately $100 mil-
lion in state funds available towards the creation of a Los Angeles
River Parkway.273 The designation of funds for the Los Angeles
River Parkway was due in large part to the efforts of State Assembly
Speaker Villaraigosa, who had been an instrumental supporter of
the reindustrialization project's opponents.274 The possibility of us-
ing such funds to obtain the Cornfield was uncertain. Proposition
12 funds were not specifically earmarked for the Cornfield, and the
Cornfield was not technically adjacent to the banks of the Los An-
geles River. Nevertheless, petitioners' discussions with state officials
indicated that the site's close proximity to the river was sufficient to
make it a potential recipient of such funds. 275
Second, in the event that the state was not in a position to ac-
269. Delvac Remarks, supra note 210.
270. Chatten-Brown Remarks, supra note 262.
271. Id.
272. Chatten-Brown & Delvac, supra note 3, at 5.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Chatten-Brown Remarks, supra note 262.
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quire the site within the proposed option agreement, the Trust for
Public Land (TPL), a national nonprofit land conservation group
headquartered in San Francisco, California, appeared financially
able and willing to serve as the initial purchaser of the Cornfield.276
TPL's offer to play this bridge role was critical, because although it
appeared likely that Proposition 12 funds would eventually become
available for the public acquisition of the Cornfield, there was
great concern among the petitioners that obstacles such as subsur-
face contamination might prevent the state from purchasing the
site within the one-year option period proposed by Majestic
Realty.277
The involvement of TPL, an established organization with rec-
ognized real estate expertise, also gave some measure of comfort to
Majestic Realty. As William Delvac commented:
It became pretty clear early on in that series of negotiations that
given that Uan Chatten Brown's] clients were not real estate ac-
quirers or developers and given that my clients weren't typically
people doing environmental land deals, it was going to be neces-
sary to bring in a party that both sides could trust, and have confi-
dence in their business ability, their intentions and motives.
That's why TPL played such a key and pivotal role ....278
In the midst of completing the briefing and preparing oral ar-
guments for the approaching hearing, the parties therefore
worked simultaneously on the draft of a settlement based on the
coin-toss proposal. Just days before the hearing date, the parties
reached agreement on the final terms of the settlement agreement
and took the hearing of the CEQA petition off the calendar.279 The
November 2000 settlement agreement contained many unique
provisions, three of which merit particular attention.
First, the parties agreed that the appraisal of the Cornfield's
value (for purposes of exercising the purchase option) would be
based on the value of the site had the City of Los Angeles fully and
276. [d.
277. Chatten-Brown & Delvac, supra note 3, at 6:
The Trust for Public Land (TPL) was brought in to do the transaction, in the
state's stead, because the state could not commit itself in the time required. In-
deed, the state arguably could not acquire contaminated property and the site
had not yet been remediated.
278. Delvac Remarks, supra note 210.
279. Settlement Agreement Between City of Los Angeles, Majestic Realty Parties, and
Chinatown Yards Alliance (Nov. 2000) (on file with author) [hereinafter November 2000
Settlement Agreement].
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lawfully approved the River Station project.280 Petitioners were
aware that this assumption would significantly increase the Corn-
field's appraised value, but agreed to this term because Majestic
Realty would not proceed with the settlement without it.281
Second, Majestic Realty and River Station LLC agreed to a "No
Opposition" clause. 282 This clause provided that, during the one-
year option period, they would not take any actions, direct or indi-
rect, to oppose or interfere with public or nonprofit funding for
the acquisition of the Cornfield, and moreover that they would as-
sist and cooperate in efforts by TPL and others to secure such
funding.283 If Majestic Realty or River Station LLC engaged in such
opposition or refused such assistance, this would constitute a
breach presumably entitling the petitioners to disregard the stay
and to proceed to a hearing on the merits of their CEQA c1aims.284
Third, the petitioners agreed to a "Covenant Not to Oppose."285
Pursuant to this covenant, petitioners agreed not to pursue their
pending legal opposition to the River Station project or other pos-
sible, future approvals related to the project during the option pe-
280. The assumptions for the appraisal were not included in the terms of the Novem-
ber 2000 Settlement Agreement, but were explained to the author by Nelson Mathews of
TPL. Nelson Mathews, Remarks at Guest Lecture for Urban Environmental Law & Policy
Seminar, Golden Gate University School of Law Quly 2002) [hereinafter Mathews Guest
Lecture].
281. ld. The terms of the appraisal were set forth in a separate Purchase and Sale
Agreement between TPL and Majestic Realty, which was referenced in Section I (a) of the
November 2000 Settlement Agreement.
282. ld. § I(c):
Majestic, River Station, and North Broadway each agree that they and their of-
ficers, shareholders, directors, partners, employees, attorneys and agents shall not
take any actions, directly or indirectly, to oppose the provision of Public Funding
from the State of California or other tax-exempt entity for the acquisition of the
Property by or from TPL.
283. ld. § 8:
Petitioners, individually and collectively, covenant not to administratively or judi-
cially oppose, litigate, sue, challenge, or contest the Project, the Project Approv-
als, or the Additional Project Approvals as defined in paragraphs 5 and 7.
Further, Petitioners, individually and collectively, agree that after the date of sign-
ing this Agreement they shall not specifically state public opposition to the Pro-
ject, the Project Approvals or the Additional Project Approvals, including without
limitation comments to the media or to public forums; provided, however, Peti-
tioners may continue to express their general desire for parks and 'greening'
projects related or adjacent to the Los Angeles River, for parks generally and for
equal access to parks and recreation.
284. ld.
285. ld.
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riod.286 This covenant provided, however, that petitioners could
continue to express their general desire for parks and greenspace
along the Los Angeles River. 287 Therefore, although the petitioners
were provided with one year to raise the acquisition funds without
opposition from Majestic Realty and River Station LLC, Majestic
Realty and River Station LLC were also provided with one year to
press forward with their reindustrialization plans without opposi-
tion from the petitioners.
Even after the stay of the CEQA litigation in November 2000, it
should be noted that there was an additional important develop-
ment in the underlying Cornfield lawsuit. On February 6,2001, the
California Attorney General's Office, headed by Attorney General
Bill Lockyer, filed an amicus brief in support of the petitioners'
position that preparation of an EIR was required.288 This amicus
brief argued that the administrative record before the City of Los
Angeles contained information indicating that Majestic Realty's
River Station project would likely have significant impacts on air
quality, subsurface contamination and historic resources. The brief
further stated that Majestic Realty's current plans did not reduce
these impacts to the levels of insignificance that made adoption of
a Mitigated Negative Declaration (MND) permissible in this
instance.289
In terms of air quality impacts, the California Attorney Gen-
eral's amicus brief maintained:
Despite the hundreds of vehicular trips that will involve vehicles
using diesel fuel, there has been no analysis and no disclosure in
the MND of the expected increase in exposure to diesel exhaust
and diesel particulate in the exhaust. . . . The failure to ade-
quately analyze the impacts from diesel emissions is particularly
troubling in light of the fact that there are four schools nearby.
Children have been identified as the group most at-risk from
286. ld. In an April 11, 2004, email to the author, Jan Chatten-Brown clarified that
the petitioners' relinquishment of their right to oppose further approvals (related to the
River Station project) was in fact an arguably insignificant relinquishment because at that
time there were no other foreseeable approvals required. The only other possible approval
had involved a challenge to the proposed federal HUD funding, which had already been
withdrawn by HUD Secretary Andrew Cuomo at the time the November 2000 Settlement
Agreement was signed.
287. ld.
288. Memorandum of Points and Authorities of Amicus Curiae, People of the State
of California ex rel. Attorney General Bill Lockyer, In Support of Petition for Writ of Man-
date, Friends of Los Angeles River v. City of Los Angeles, No. B5-065205 (Los Angeles
Superior Court, memorandum filed Feb. 6, 2001) (on file with author).
289. ld. at 2.
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these toxic emissions. . . . [T] he MND may not rely on the later
approval process of the SCAQMD [Southern California Air Qual-
ity Management District]; it must spell out the mitigation for the
foreseeable significant impacts of the project. There should be
specific measures that will be implemented, rather than sug-
gested regulation that mayor may not be imposed in the future
by another entity. Further, because the mitigation measures for
impacts to air quality are not described, there is no substantial
evidence that the adverse impacts of diesel exhaust emissions will
be mitigated in any manner, let alone to a level of
insignificance.29o
In terms of impacts on historic resources, the amicus brief filed
by the California Attorney General contended that the City disre-
garded information in the administrative record (referred to as the
"AR" in the brief):
An intact portion of the [Zanja Madre] aqueduct was discovered
in April of 2000, near the project site, and remnants of the Zanja
Madre run through the property. (AR 3:333-336; 1:2062-2063.)
Although the MND acknowledges this fact, there is still no analy-
sis of this archaeological find or the possibility that more of the
Zanja Madre may be found on the property. In lieu of mitigation,
the MND merely states that, if more remnants of the canal are
discovered, documentation of the resource will be conducted
consistent with the Secretary of the Interior's Standard for
Archaeological Documentation. (AR 3:333-336; 13:2498.) Under
CEQA, more is required; preservation in place is the preferred
manner of mitigating impacts to historical resources of an
archaeological nature. Mere documentation of a historical re-
source during construction of a project that may destroy the re-
source does not alleviate the impacts of the destruction. Instead,
a study of the extent of the Zanja Madre on the property and the
project's impacts on the Zanja Madre should be done before con-
struction begins, and reasonable alternatives and feasible mitiga-
tion should be considered. 291
The amicus brief filed by the California Attorney General un-
derscored the risk and uncertainty for Majestic Realty should the
Cornfield CEQA lawsuit proceed to a hearing on the merits.
VI. ACQUIRING THE CORNFIELD AS PUBLIC LAND: ANATOMY OF
THE DEAL
Pursuant to the November 2000 settlement agreement, the first
step was to have the Cornfield appraised. Again, this appraisal was
to be based on an assumption that the City of Los Angeles had fully
290. Id. at 4-6 (citation omitted).
291. [d. at 8 (citations omitted).
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and lawfully approved the River Station project.292 This appraisal,
performed by an appraiser selected jointly by TPL and Majestic Re-
alty, came in at $33.5 million.293
With the November 2000 settlement agreement in place, and
the appraisal complete, TPL and the Chinatown Yards Alliance
went to work. Two separate yet interrelated elements had to fall
into place for petitioners to take advantage of the acquisition op-
portunity provided by the settlement. First, TPL needed to find a
means to finance the $33.5 million initial purchase of the Corn-
field. 294 Second, TPL needed an assurance that soon after its ini-
tial acquisition, the State of California would buy the property from
TPL. The State of California was a necessary party because the City
of Los Angeles was unable to provide the funds to purchase the
site, and because TPL could not carry the burden of mortgage pay-
ments for very long.295 It was this second element that proved the
more complex.
Largely as a result of the efforts of the members of the China-
town Yards Alliance, California Governor Gray Davis and California
State Parks announced their support for state acquisition of the
Cornfield soon after the November 2000 settlement agreement was
signed.296 This pledge of support, however, brought a new and
thorny question to the forefront. California State Parks has a gen-
eral policy of not acquiring property that requires additional sub-
surface remediation before it can be used as parkland.297 This
policy, which stems from concerns about cleanup liability, means
that sellers generally need to present a property to California State
Parks in "turn-key" (ready for park use) condition.298 Given that
previous environmental investigations had identified the presence
of subsurface contamination at the Cornfield, this turn-key require-
ment emerged as an obstacle to plans to transfer the site to the
state.
In response to this turn-key requirement, TPL and California
292. See supra note 280.
293. Nelson Mathews, Materials Submitted for "The Value of Urban Greenspace: Les-
sons from the Los Angeles Cornfield," Panel at the Annual Conference of the Real Prop-
erty Law Section of the State Bar of California (Apr. 27, 2002) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Mathews Materials].
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State Parks focused on efforts to quantify what the Cornfield's sub-
surface contamination meant in financial terms. More specifically,
the following environmental questions needed to be answered:
What was the extent and severity of the subsurface contamination
throughout the site? How much would it cost to remediate the site
to turn-key condition for a park? How long would it take to remedi-
ate the site to turn-key condition? What mechanisms were available
to protect against potential cost-overruns related to the remedia-
tion necessary to restore the site to parkland condition?
To begin to answer these questions, TPL first needed to obtain
access to the Cornfield to conduct additional subsurface testing.
The previous environmental investigations had focused on certain
discrete areas of the property and were not sufficient to fully char-
acterize subsurface conditions at the site.299 Without this full char-
acterization, TPL was not in a position to obtain assurances
regarding what remediation the California Department of Toxic
Substances Control (DTSC) , the state agency exercising environ-
mental oversight, would require to make the site ready for park
use.300 Securing this access, however, proved somewhat compli-
cated because of an arrangement between Majestic Realty and
Union Pacific.
Although Majestic Realty had purchased certain development
rights in connection with the Cornfield (including the right to
purchase the site), Union Pacific still retained legal title to the
property at the time the November 2000 settlement agreement was
signed.30l Union Pacific was not a party to the November 2000 set-
tlement agreement and, as the present owner of-record of the
Cornfield, it was concerned about the potential implications of al-
lowing further subsurface testing.302 Union Pacific was aware of the
possibility that this additional testing might prompt DTSC to im-
pose further cleanup requirements for the site, and that Union Pa-
cific might be left to fulfill these obligations if the Majestic Realty
or TPL acquisition plans somehow fell through. Union Pacific
therefore was not prepared to provide TPL's environmental con-
sultants with access to the Cornfield unless these liability concerns
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Nelson Mathews, Remarks at "The Value of Urban Greenspace: Lessons from
the Los Angeles Cornfield," Panel at the Annual Conference of the Real Property Law
Section of the State Bar of California (Apr. 27, 2002) (transcript on file with author) [here-
inafter Mathews Conference Remarks].
302. Mathews Guest Lecture, supra note 280.
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were first addressed.303
In the end, the issue of access was resolved when Majestic Realty
agreed to an outright purchase of the Cornfield from Union Pa-
cific.304 Although M~estic Realty was obligated to cooperate with
TPL and the Chinatown Yards Alliance pursuant to the November
2000 settlement, it is highly unlikely that the courts would have
interpreted this contractual cooperation obligation to compel Ma-
jestic Realty to purchase the property in order to facilitate access to
the petitioners. However, it is possible that the Chinatown Yards
Alliance plaintiffs that were parties to the November 2000 settle-
ment agreement could have argued successfully that Majestic Re-
alty did not fully disclose its limited ownership interest in and
access rights over the Cornfield, and that this non-disclosure im-
properly induced them to enter into the settlement.
Although there were risks to Majestic Realty in allowing TPL's
acquisition efforts to falter because of Union Pacific's refusal to
provide site access, Majestic Realty's willingness to acquire the
Cornfield from Union Pacific was also an indication that the dy-
namics between the parties had begun to change. At the time the
November 2000 settlement agreement was signed, Majestic Realty
was convinced that the option would not be exercised and that the
River Station project would proceed as planned after a year's delay.
As Majestic Realty's attorney William Delvac commented: "I think
M~estic sincerely believed that the funding would never be there
and that there would never be a sale."305
Soon after the November 2000 settlement agreement was an-
nounced, however, there was a surge in public and political enthu-
siasm for and commitment to the park alternative.306 Although
Majestic Realty was committed to receiving adequate compensation
for its investment in the River Station project, it was not immune to
this enthusiasm. As the public and political tide began to turn, in-
creasingly Majestic Realty wanted to be perceived as a participant
(albeit a self-interested and an initially reluctant participant)
rather than an opponent to efforts to secure the Cornfield as pub-
lic parkland.307 As Nelson Mathews, TPL's point person for the
Cornfield negotiations, stated at the April 2002 California State Bar
303. /d.
304. Mathews Conference Remarks, supra note 301.
305. Delvac Remarks, supra note 210.
306. Mathews Guest Lecture, supra note 280.
307. [d.
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Conference: "The end result was Majestic stepped up and bought
the property from Union Pacific which was an increase in their
risk. I salute them for doing that because they provided us with the
access to get out there and test the property."308
Majestic Realty's motivations for its change in position were
most likely multifaceted. With the November 2000 settlement
agreement in place, the company was guaranteed a reasonable rate
of return on its investment even if TPL was able to raise the neces-
sary acquisition money. If the Chinatown Yards Alliance plaintiffs
were successful in arguing that they were fraudulently induced into
entering into the settlement (due to non-disclosure of Majestic Re-
alty's limited ownership interest), and these plaintiffs ultimately
prevailed on their CEQA claim, then the value of the Cornfield
property would be far less than it would be under the terms of the
settlement. Given these considerations, and in light of the public
relations problems it would face if it were to set itself against a pro-
ject that had garnered widespread public and political support, Ma-
jestic Realty's actions begin to make business sense.
Once Majestic Realty owned the Cornfield, TPL's environmen-
tal consultants were provided access to complete the additional
testing and characterization of the site's subsurface conditions. As
a result of this additional testing and characterization, TPL's envi-
ronmental consultants estimated that it would cost between $1 mil-
lion and $3.5 million to clean the site to a condition where DTSC
would permit the use of the property as public parkland.309 Al-
though these cleanup cost estimates were not great in proportion
to the $33.5 million appraisal, the California State Parks' turn-key
requirement remained a problem. TPL's environmental consul-
tants estimated it could take several years to complete the remedia-
tion and restore the Cornfield to turn-key condition. However,
TPL was not in a position to hold title and to make payments on
the site during this multi-year remediation process.310
The turn-key question was ultimately resolved through a two-
fold approach. First, although TPL would sell the site to the State
of California, TPL would remain responsible for performing the
remediation required by DTSC to restore the property to a condi-
tion suitable for parkland purposes.311 Second, TPL purchased an
308. Mathews Conference Remarks, supra note 301.
309. [d.
310. Mathews Guest Lecture, supra note 280.
311. [d.
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environmental insurance policy that provided coverage for cost
overruns which might be associated with cleanup of the identified
contamination, and $10 million in coverage for unknown environ-
mental conditions.312 Along with TPL, the State of California was
named as an additional insured on this environmental insurance
policy.313 With these liability-shifting and insurance mechanisms in
place, the State of California agreed to purchase and accept title to
the Cornfield even though the site was not yet in park-ready envi-
ronmental condition.
As the pieces for the park alternative began to fall into place,
Majestic Realty agreed to extend the November 1, 2001 option
deadline by several weeks.314 The willingness of Majestic Realty to
grant this extension was one more indication of how the dynamics
between the parties to the November 2000 settlement agreement
had shifted over the course of the year.
On December 21, 2001, California Governor Gray Davis held a
press conference on the Broadway bluffs of Chinatown overlooking
the Cornfield.315 Present for the press conference were a sea of
children from the surrounding neighborhoods, and representa-
tives from numerous member-organizations of the Chinatown
Yards Alliance, from TPL, and from Majestic Realty.316 Also present
was newly-elected Los Angeles Mayor James Hahn who, unlike his
mayoral predecessor Richard Riordan, had voiced his support for
the park alternative.317 At the base of the Broadway bluffs, a mere
thirty feet below where the press conference microphones and
312. Id; see also Mathews Materials, supra note 293; Markus Niebanck, Cornfield Re-
port (2003) (unpublished report on file with author) [hereinafter Niebanck Report].
Niebanck, who oversaw TPL's remediation of the Cornfield, explains:
In addition to generating data relative to the nature and distribution of site con-
tamination, comprehensive site investigations are designed to satisfy the under-
writing requirements for environmental insurance. The results of the Cornfield
investigation provided the technical underpinning for the acquisition of two such
insurance policies. The first, environmental cost cap coverage, provided a mea-
sure of safety in the event that ensuing remedial action required financing in
excess of what initial investigative data suggested reasonable. The·second cover-
age protected against the discovery of site contamination at a date after the site
cleanup was complete.
Mathews Materials, supra note 293.
313. Mathews Guest Lecture, supra note 280.
314. Id.
315. Matea Gold, State Plans 2 Parks By L.A. River, L.A. TIMES, Dec, 22, 2001, at Part 2,
1.
316. Id.; Mathews Guest Lecture, supra note 280.
317. Gold, supra note 315. During the mayoral campaigns, Hahn was serving as Los
Angeles City Attorney and his office represented the City of Los Angeles in the Cornfield
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cameras were positioned, lay the excavation site where the remains
of the original Zanja Madre had been located just a year earlier.
At the December 21, 2001 press conference, Governor Davis
announced that with funds made available by the passage of Pro-
position 12, California State Parks was acquiring the thirty-two
flatland acres of the Cornfield site for $36 million.318 The Santa
Monica Mountains Conservancy, another state agency, would ac-
quire the remaining eight acres of the bluff.3Ig
The Chinatown Yards Alliance's gamble had paid off. The op-
tion was exercised by TPL, the River Station project was stopped,
and the Cornfield was on its way to becoming an urban state park.
As Mayor Hahn remarked at the December 21, 2001 press confer-
ence: "It is a great day for the people of Los Angeles because an old
railyard that has been an eyesore for many years is now going to
provide open space and green land in the heart of downtown."32o
VII. A CORNFIELD STATE PARK TAKES SHAPE
In early 2002, the debate over the Cornfield shifted from
whether it would be a park to what type of park it would be. Al-
though the latter debate lacks the courtroom and political drama
of the former debate, it is nonetheless proving complex to resolve
as well. This is due to the diverse nature of the Chinatown Yards
Alliance.
Although the members of the Chinatown Yards Alliance were
united in their opposition to Majestic Realty's reindustrialization
project, these members also held contrasting visions of the park
that should be built. These contrasting visions were based in large
part on the different histories, cultural preferences, and perceived
needs of those groups with a stake in and connection to the
Cornfield.
Perhaps the clearest illustration of these contrasting visions can
be found in the March 2001 conceptual plan prepared for the Chi-
natown Yards Alliance by architect and planner Arthur Golding
CEQA litigation. Given the pending lawsuit, Hahn therefore did not express his support
for the park alternative until after the mayoral election.
318. [d.
319. [d.; see also Chatten-Brown Materials, supra note 167.
320. Gold, supra note 315; The Trust for Pub. Land, TPL and Davis Deliver a Gift to
L.A, at http://www.tpl.org/tier3_cd.cfm?contenCitem_id=7265&folder_id=266 (last vis-
ited Mar. 15, 2004).
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(Golding Conceptual Plan).321
The Golding Conceptual Plan was created to articulate and give
form to the alternative park vision for the Cornfield. It was de-
signed to appeal to the broad array of community, interest group,
and political stakeholders that could be marshaled to help ensure
the demise of Majestic Realty's reindustrialization project and the
success of TPL's and California State Park's acquisition efforts.322
The centerpiece of the Golding Conceptual Plan was a landscape
map that depicted the elements, structures, and uses that a non-
industrialized Cornfield might contain.323 Among other things, this
landscape map included: a Zanja Madre Museum; a Chinatown Pa-
vilion Cultural Center (which would house a California State Parks
office); a Shaolin Institute; soccer fields; a bicycle path; a magnet
school with accompanying auditorium, library and gymnasium; a
"Zanja Nueva" stream that would divert some of the waters of the
Los Angeles River through the property; a new Blue Line Light
Rail Station; and a "Great Meadow."324 This was much to ask of a
forty-acre site, eight acres of which consisted of relatively inaccessi-
ble steep bluff.
The Cornfield is blessed and burdened with complex histories.
It is adjacent to the site of early Native American settlements that
are the roots of why and where downtown Los Angeles exists. It is
part of the story of Spanish Missionaries' arrival in Southern Cali-
fornia. It is linked to the settlement, relocation, and racism involv-
ing the city's Latino, Chinese, and Mrican-American citizens. It
evokes how the Los Angeles River defined the area's ecology
before it was entombed in concrete. Its railyards, notwithstanding
the subsurface contamination left behind, represent a critical piece
of the city's economic and transportation legacy. A park on the site
therefore potentially has much to say.
As the 2000 UCLA-Occidental College Report on the Cornfield
noted:
Debate over the history of the Cornfield site, then, is as much
about constructing 'whose history' and 'whose identity' as it is
about 'what history.' Constructing history is an immense under-
taking in itself, full of inaccuracy and bias and, in essence, unver-
321. 2001 Conceptual Plan Materials provided to author by Arthur Golding (on file
with author) [hereinafter Golding Conceptual Plan].
322. [d. This was also the subject of a July II, 2002, phone conversation between
author and Arthur Golding.
323. [d.
324. [d.
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ifiable. . . . Constructing history as a narrative is a process of
remembering, and has a very personal tie to identity. Attacks on
historical narratives are thus construed as attacks on personal ide-
ologies, and the underlying drama takes on a far more emotional
aspect than simple historical concern.325
This is not to say that, in the context of designing the new
Cornfield park, there may not be ways to bring these multiple his-
tories into a coherent and complementary whole. Rather, it simply
reveals that the different park stakeholders bring a different set of
priorities to the park planning process.
Consider, for example, the contrasting perspectives of two of
the most prominent founding members of the Chinatown Yards
Alliance, the Latino Urban Forum, and FolAR.
The Latino Urban Forum is not opposed to honoring the leg-
acy or improving the ecology of the Los Angeles River. Its involve-
ment in the Chinatown Yards Alliance, however, was motivated
more by the goal of securing additional recreational space for the
Latino community in the vicinity of the Cornfield. The creation of
grass soccer fields for Latino youth was and is a paramount con-
cern. In December 2002, Robert Garcia and others at CLIPI pub-
lished a report entitled Dreams ofFields: Soccer, Community, and Equal
Justice. 326 Among other things, Dreams ofFields argued:
The history of the Cornfield is the history of struggle, hope, and
triumph for the community. Children who dream of soccer fields
and their families and friends are entitled to equal access to play-
ing fields in the parks they struggled to create.
Fields for soccer squarely fulfill the State Parks mission. The
primary State Parks mission is to provide for the "HEALTH, INSPIRA-
TION, and EDUCATION of the People of California," and to do this
by "creating opportunities for high-quality outdoor recreation"
and "protecting its most valued NATURAL and CULTURAL RE-
SOURCES." Soccer fulfills these five elements for individuals and
the community. Soccer improves human health, inspires players
and fans, and educates players through life-long lessons in team-
work, leadership, and self-esteem. Soccer is played on a flat open
space in harmony with natural settings.
Soccer is among the most valued cultural and historical re-
325. CENZATTI ET AL., supra note 2, §2 at 56-57.
326. ROBERT GARCIA, ERICA S. FLORES, ELIZABETH PINE & THE CTR. FOR LAw IN THE
PUB. INTEREST, DREAMS OF FIELDS: SOCCER, COMMUNIIT, AND EQUAL JUSTICE (Report on
Sports in Urban Parks to the California Deparunent of Parks and Recreation) (Dec. 2002)
[hereinafter DREAMS OF FIELDS]. .
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sources of Latino and other immigrant communities.327
FoUR, for its part, is not opposed to soccer, soccer fields or
providing recreational opportunities to Latino youth. FoUR's in-
volvement in the Chinatown Yards Allia~ce, however, was
prompted by the goal of having the Cornfield site contribute to the
greater revitalization of the Los Angeles River and its riverfront
lands.328 As such, FoUR has an interest in ensuring that the Corn-
field park contains a strong water element. This water element
could involve diverting some of the waters of the Los Angeles River
across the site (such as through the "Zanja Nueva" proposed in the
Golding Conceptual Plan) or perhaps through extending the
Cornfield park so that it is actually adjacent to the river's banks. As
Jan Chatten-Brown explained at the April 2002 California State Bar
Conference, the parcel of land that separates the northeast corner
of the Cornfield (near the North Broadway Bridge) from the river
is currently being used as a staging ground for construction of the
Pasadena Gold Line, part of the city's new light rail public transit
system.329 FoLAR is understandably interested in exploring the fea-
sibility of adding this parcel to the Cornfield park once its use as a
construction staging area ends.330
The Latino Urban Forum and FoLAR represent just a few of
the many histories and priorities seeking recognition in the new
park.
To provide a framework to discuss and hopefully resolve the
diverging views of what a park on the Cornfield site should be, the
State Senate Bill authorizing California State Parks' acquisition of
the Cornfield also included provisions for the establishment of a
Cornfield State Park Advisory Committee (Park Advisory Commit-
tee).331 One of the responsibilities of the Park Advisory Committee
is to provide the Director of California State Parks with "a list of
prioritized development recommendations for long-range plans
for the site that meet the needs of Californians and the general
public, including park and recreational facilities and programs
serving residents within communities surrounding the Cornfield
rail yards in central Los Angeles."332 A summary of the Park Advi-
sory Committee's recommendations is provided at the end of this
327. [d. at 3-5.
328. Interview with Lewis MacAdams, supra note 219.
329. Chatten-Brown Remarks, supra note 262.
330. [d.
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section. An evaluation of these recommendations, however, is
aided by some preliminary discussion of the policy issues that face
urban parks in general and the Cornfield park in particular.
A. Eyes-on-the-Park
One of the most thoughtful examinations of the role of urban
parks in the United States was presented byJaneJacobs in her 1961
work The Death and Life of Great American Cities.333 This book con-
tained an expansive chapter entitled "The Uses of Neighborhood
Parks" in which Jacobs challenged the notion that urban parks are,
by their very nature, beneficial from a community standpoint.334
According to Jacobs, whether a particular urban park serves as a
dangerous crime zone or a cherished neighborhood asset depends
largely on the mixture of buildings that surround a park and how
this mixture affects who uses the park and when.335 As her state-
ments below reveal, Jacobs concluded that a ~ore critical assess-
ment of the urban parks question was needed:
Conventionally, neighborhood parks or parklike open spaces are
considered boons conferred on the deprived populations of cit-
ies. Let us turn this thought around, and consider city parks de-
prived places that need the boon of life and appreciation
conferred on them.336
Jacobs argues that:
In orthodox city planning, neighborhood open spaces are vener-
ated in an amazingly uncritical fashion, much as savages venerate
magical fetishes.
More Open Space for what? For muggings? For bleak vacuums
between buildings? Or for ordinary people to use and enjoy? But
people do not use city open space just because it is there and
because city planners or designers wish they would.
It is necessary too, in understanding park behavior, to junk the
false reassurance that parks are real estate stabilizers or commu-
nity anchors. Parks are not automatically anything, and least of all
are these volatile elements stabilizers of values or of their neigh-
borhoods and districts.
333. JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES (Modem Library
Random House 1993) (1961).
334. [d. at 116-45.
335. [d.
336. [d. at 116.
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Unpopular parks are troubling not only because of the waste and
missed opportunities they imply, but also because of their fre-
quent negative effects. They have the same problems as streets
without eyes, and their dangers spill over into the areas surround-
ing, so that streets along such parks become known as danger
places too and are avoided.337
Finally, Jacobs states:
City parks are not abstractions, or automatic repositories of virtue
or uplift, any more than sidewalks are abstractions. They mean
nothing divorced from their practical, tangible uses, and hence
they mean nothing divorced from the tangible effects on them-
for good or for ill-of the city districts and uses touching them.
Generalized parks can and do add great attraction to neighbor-
hoods that people find attractive for a great variety of other uses.
[But, tJhey further depress neighborhoods that people find unat-
tractive for a wide variety of other uses, for they exaggerate the
dullness, the danger, the emptiness.338
Jacobs' immediate reference point for her comments regarding
urban parks were those open spaces created as part of the feder-
ally-funded urban renewal projects of the 1950s and early 1960s.339
These were housing projects usually built on the site of recendy
cleared neighborhoods.340 Most of these cleared neighborhoods
were primarily Mrican-American, and the housing projects were
generally undertaken over the objections of the people whose
homes and businesses were destroyed to clear the land.341 Jacobs'
comments therefore apply particularly to those urban parks that
are imposed upon already distressed communities by outside
planners.
The park at the Cornfield site, whatever form it ultimately
takes, is fortunate to have been born under circumstances that are
quite different from those of many of the parks discussed inJacobs'
book. The Cornfield site was not secured as parkland as a result of
337. Id. at 117-23.
338. Id. at 145.
339. Id. at 122 ("One of the bitterest disappointments in housing project history is
the failure of the parks and open grounds in these establishments to increase adjacent
values or to stabilize, let alone improve, their neighborhoods."); Id. at 132 ("But there is no
point in bringing parks to where the people are, if in the process the reasons that the
people are there are wiped out and the park substituted for them. This is one of the basic
errors in housing-project and civic- and cultural-eenter design."); see also generally MARTIN
ANDERSON, THE FEDERAL BULLDOZER: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF URBAN RENEWAL, 1949-1962
(1964).
340. See generally ANDERSON, supra note 339.
341. Id.
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the destruction of an existing neighborhood, nor was it the result
of a plan imposed on an existing community by outside planners.
Rather, the Cornfield site was secured as parkland because of the
political demand for such parkland by the surrounding neighbor-
hoods. As such, these communities have a commitment to and a
sense of ownership in the Cornfield park site that is far removed
from many of the park scenarios described by Jacobs.
Notwithstanding the Cornfield park site's favorable origins,
many of the points raised by Jacobs still have applicability to evalu-
ating what type of park the Cornfield might become. Of particular
importance, Jacobs notes that parks should be used by diverse
groups of people, in diverse ways, and at diverse times.342 An urban
park (or a portion of a park) that is infrequently occupied or is not
surrounded by buildings where there are "eyes-on-the-park" is in
danger of becoming a vacuum that depresses rather than enhances
adjacent communities.343 Th~smeans that the success of the park at
the Cornfield site will depend in large part on the vitality of the
areas that border the park.
This eyes-on-the-park consideration bodes well for those north-
ern areas of the Cornfield site, along Chinatown's Broadway bluffs,
but does not bode well for the long stretch of the southeastern
portion of Cornfield site along Spring Street. Unlike the resi-
dences, restaurants, and late-night street activity on Broadway,
much of the area adjacent to the Spring Street side of the park is
lined with industrial warehouses that close at night.344 This means
that, under present circumstances, in the evenings much of the
southern edge of the Cornfield park will be fronted by a street with
no pedestrians, no residents, and no open businesses.345 These are
the conditions surrounding a park that can result in the unwatched
dead-zone urban open space warned of by Jacobs. These condi-
tions also suggest that the Cornfield park would benefit from addi-
tional residences, restaurants, and nightlife along the parkside
stretch of Spring Street, and that these adjacent land-use changes
should be evaluated as part of the park planning process.
B. Traces of History
The communities that have lived and continue to live near the
342. JACOBS, supra note 333, at 125-26.
343. /d. at 123.
344. Interview with Lewis MacAdams, supra note 219.
345. [d.
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Cornfield have rich histories. The Cornfield site-with its early irri-
gation canal, its ties to the once wild and unpaved Los Angeles
River, and its prominence in the city's railroad past-is also a place
of great historical significance. In terms of incorporating these ele-
ments into the new park, however, the challenge is that very little
of this history is reflected in the remaining physical artifacts or
structures on the site.
This challenge was discussed in the 2000 UCLA-Occidental Col-
lege Report:
Recent developments in preservation planning and legislation
have brought greater attention to the non-physical aspects of his-
tory, especially in relation to a historic sense;of-place. By includ-
ing cultural landscapes and addressing issues of historic
importance rather than solely historic artifacts, the issue of what
is to be preserved is made richer, but also more complex.346
It continues:
The paradox of the Cornfield is that while the site has played a
significant role in the development of Los Angeles, few physical
traces remain.
The Cornfield' [sic] significance derives largely from the as-
sociations of cultural groups with the area, and their history and
development. To this end, the discussion of cultural heritage and
cultural landscapes are the most important for the future of the
Cornfield, and serve as the basis for an argument to include these
groups in planning action and decision-making. These cultural
groups include the Chinese-American and Mexican-American
groups which have long lived and worked in the area.... Not to
be forgotten are the original inhabitants-the Gabrielinos-
whose village ofYangna formed the basis for the siting of today's
Los Angeles.347
With the Cornfield site, therefore, the park cannot reasonably
be characterized simply as an effort to preserve history. Rather, the
park must also be understood as an effort to design a new public
space with structures and uses that evoke and honor certain ethnic,
cultural, and ecological connections that are no longer visible on
the site. The Cornfield park planning process is therefore inher-
ently a blend of restoration, preservation, and creation.
C. 2003 Park Advisory Committee Report
The thirty-six members of the Park Advisory Committee were
selected by California State Parks from a pool of more than a hun-
346. CENZATTI ET AL., supra note 2, § 2 at 62.
347. Ill. at 66.
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dred applicants.348 Members include several of the individuals in-
volved in the Chinatown Yards Alliance's efforts to stop Majestic
Realty's River Station project, such as Chi Mui (of the Chinese Be-
nevolent Society Association and formerly of State Senator Po-
lanco's office), Robert Garcia of CLIPI, Lewis MacAdams of
FoLAR, and Joel Reynolds of NRDC. 349
From the spring of 2002 through the spring of 2003, the Park
Advisory Committee met regularly to work on its proposed design
recommendations. In April of 2003, the Park Advisory Committee
presented a report to the Director of California State Parks entitled
A Unified Vision for Cornfield State Park (Unified Vision) .350 The intro-
ductory section to Unified Vision acknowledges the challenge of
stitching the diverse Cornfield histories and stakeholders into a sin-
gle park plan:
Throughout its process, the Committee invited experts to address
the group, including George Hargreaves, the Chairman of the
Department of Landscape Architecture in the Harvard Graduate
School of Design. A leading urban park designer, Professor Har-
greaves urged the Committee to develop a visionary sense of
place at the Cornfield, not just a list of recommended uses. He
advised the Committee to be cognizant of the "carrying capacity"
of a 32-acre site and to strive for an "organic whole" rather than
creating a patchwork, "balkanized" space that seeks to accommo-
date a multiplicity of interests. A single park, he noted could not
meet the Los Angeles Basin's entire park, restoration and open
space needs.351
Unified Vision then goes on to identify and discuss the four es-
sential themes it believes should guide the design of a Cornfield
State Park: connectivity; cultural-historical, including the role of
water in the development of the region; recreation; and
transportation. 352
In the section on the connectivity element, Unified Vision
provides:
A critical issue is the development of the Cornfield site into the
broader design of a Los Angeles River greenway. Though only 32
acres in size, the park is a critical component and the first jewel in
an emerald bracelet of the emerging Los Angeles River greenway
stretching from the San Gabriel Mountains to the Pacific Ocean.
348. Unified Vision, supra note 206, at 1.
349. California State Parks, Roster of Cornfield State Park Advisory Committee
(2002) (on file with author).
350. Unified Vision, supra note 206.
351. [d. at 5.
352. [d. at 2.
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Park users should experience a feeling of connection with the
adjoining river greenway. One way to achieve this is with key de-
sign elements such as vegetation, art, water features, benches,
lighting, and interpretation. The park should provide visitors a
sense of shade and sanctuary.
Fundamental to this goal of Greenway connectivity is the acquisi-
tion of suitable transitional parcels adjacent to the Cornfield. On
the north, the Midway Railroad Yard, designated by the MTA
[Metropolitan Transportation Authority] as a "temporary" stag-
ing area for the Pasadena Gold Line, is the only way to connect
the Cornfield to Elysian Park and the River.
In addition, the Cornfield should help connect human communi-
ties.... [T] he Cornfield could anchor not only a physical "green-
belt" but a rich multi-ethnic cultural corridor of communities
and historic districts that exists through Northeast and Central
Los Angeles to the City's birthplace of EI Pueblo and the Little
Tokyo historical district.353
In the section on the cultural-historical element, Unified Vision
states:
The value of the Cornfield lies in its potential to slice through
time, connecting these larger historical and social patterns to the
personal stories relevant to the contemporary experience of
Angelinos. It will serve as a touchstone through which all of us
can come to see how we fit into the greater Los Angeles story.354
In the section on the recreation element, Unified Vision
maintains:
The Cornfield should include as part of its legacy a balanced park
that includes large open area for soccer and other sports, inte-
grated harmoniously with the natural setting and the cultural and
historical values at stake in this urban California State Park.355
In the section on the transportation element, Unified Vision
suggests:
Transportation has long been prominently associated with the
Cornfield site, from the railroads and trolleys in the recent past
to the Gold Line currently under construction and the freeways
that criss-cross the neighboring communities. Design could both
recognize this history and embrace environmentally-friendly
353. Id. at 8.
354. Id. at 9-10.
355. Id. at 13.
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transportation systems within the Cornfield, its adjacent commu-
nities and all nearby cultural and recreational points of interest.
Transportation within the park, whether pedestrian, equestrian,
bicycle, transit, parking or national historical trails, should link
up with systems outside the park. Transportation systems must be
integral to park and recreational uses and designed in a manner
consistent with retaining, to the maximum extent possible, land
available for other park purposes.356
At present, it is still unclear how the ideas and considerations
reflected in these four themes can or should be woven together to
create a unified vision that avoids the type of balkanization warned
of by Professor Hargreaves. The creation of a park with different
sections of parkland reserved for different ethnic or stakeholder
constituencies remains a possibility. The Park Advisory Committee
appears cognizant of this potential scenario and seems philosoph-
ically committed to preventing its realization, yet how this will
translate on-the-ground remains to be seen. The difficulty will be
finding ways to design a coherent, compact urban greenspace that
somehow recognizes and serves the varied communities, histories,
and interests that have coalesced on and around the Cornfield.
An important test of this unified vision will be the selection of
the park's name. At present, several potential candidates present
themselves: Cornfield State Park, Zanja Madre State Park, Yangna
State Park, Chinatown Yards State Park, Railyard State Park. The
Park Advisory Committee's comments on the naming question are
indicative of both the troubles and opportunities that may lie
ahead for the park:
The Committee is unanimous in its view that the park name is
extremely important. It sets the tone for public acceptance and
initiates the thought processes for marketing. While stopping
short of recommending a specific name, the Committee recom-
mends that the site name should both reflect the rich historic
and cultural heritage of the area and convey a relevant statement
that will appeal to all ages.357
The general sentiment expressed in these comments may enjoy
the support of the varied interests represented on the Park Advi-
sory Committee, but it is not altogether clear how this sentiment
will ultimately contribute to resolving the question of the park's
356. [d. at 13-14.
357. [d. at 15.
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name. The same could also be said about the actual physical form
the park will take.
VIII. CORNFIELD LESSONS FOR Los ANGELES, CALIFORNIA, AND
THE NATION
The process by which the Cornfield was reclaimed as riverside
parkland contains many elements that are situation-specific. These
include the presence of historic Zanja Madre remnants on the
property and the willingness of Majestic Realty to engage in the
type of creative negotiations that ultimately led to the November
2000 settlement agreement.
Notwithstanding these particularities, there are elements of the
Cornfield story that have broader application and import. Such ele-
ments include the economic risks to urban developers who disre-
gard community opposition to reindustrialization proposals for
vacant land, the growing recognition of the greenspace opportuni-
ties created by former urban railyard sites, and the potential role of
the federal government in restoring urban rivers and adjacent
riverfront land.
A. Lessons for Los Angeles: The 2001 Taylor Yard Acquisition
Upstream from the Cornfield, and on the other side of the Los
Angeles River, is a series of contiguous former and current Union
Pacific Railroad properties known collectively as Taylor Yard.358
One of the Taylor Yard properties is a forty-acre riverfront site re-
ferred to as Parcel D.359
Taylor Yard's Parcel D is similar to the Cornfield in many re-
spects. It is similar in size. It has subsurface contamination from its
previous railway uses.360 In the early 1990s, the site was identified
by the surrounding community and environmentalists as potential
public parkland.361 In the late 1990s, Florida-based Lennar Part-
ners (Lennar) proposed a project on the site with 650,000 square
358. Coalition for a State Park at Taylor Yard, Taylor Yard: Parcels, at http:/ /
www.tayloryard.org/parcels.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2004).
359. Id.
360. Coalition for a State Park at Taylor Yard, Taylor Yard: History, at http:/ /
www.tayloryard.org/history.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2004) [hereinafter Taylor Yard
History] .
361. Id. The parkland possibilities for Taylor Yard were addressed at the 1998 The
River Through Downtown conference, as well as in other studies, such as the 1992 report,
Taylor Yard: A Catalyst for Community Change, by the Taylor Yard Area Planning and Urban
Design Workshop (Oct. 1992).
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feet of new industrial warehouse space.362 In connection with its
approval of the Lennar warehouse project, the City of Los Angeles
adopted a Mitigated Neg Dec under CEQA instead of requiring
preparation of an EIR.363 What distinguishes Taylor Yard's Parcel D
from the Cornfield is the manner in which Lennar responded to
legal opposition to its project.
When the Mitigated Neg Dec was adopted for the Lennar
reindustrialization project, this decision was challenged in a lawsuit
filed by a number of community and neighborhood groups that
had banded together to form the Coalition for a State Park at Tay-
lor Yard. The cast of organizations and individuals involved in the
Taylor Yard CEQA litigation overlapped considerably with those in-
volved in the previous Cornfield CEQA litigation. For instance, the
petitioners in the Taylor Yard lawsuit included FoLAR, Latino Ur-
ban Forum, and NRDC, and these petitioners were once again rep-
resented by Jan Chatten-Brown of Chatten-Brown & Associates.364
Unlike Majestic Realty, however, Lennar did not pursue settle-
ment negotiations with the petitioners. The Taylor Yard CEQA law-
suit went to a full hearing on the merits, at which the court set
aside the Mitigated Neg Dec and ordered preparation of a full
EIR.365 Mter the hearing, recognizing that the EIR preparation
could set back the project several years, Lennar approached Cali-
fornia State Parks about the possible purchase of Parcel D for park-
land.366 Following the outcome of the CEQA lawsuit, however, the
value of Lennar's Parcel D had decreased markedly.367 Moreover,
there was no Trust for Public Land (TPL) to step in and deal with
the problem of restoring the site to the turn-key environmental
condition required by California State Parks. In December 2001,
Lennar and Union Pacific (which had retained title to ten of Parcel
D's forty acres) sold Taylor Yard's Parcel D to the State of Califor-
nia for parkland, but at a price and under conditions much less
favorable to Lennar and the railroad than those at which Majestic
Realty was able to sell the Cornfield.368
A comparison of the Cornfield and Taylor Yard situations yields
potential lessons for developers proposing to reindustrialize vacant




366. Chatten-Brown Remarks, supra note 262.
367. [d.
368. [d.; see also Chatten-Brown & Delvac, supra note 3, at 7.
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urban land in the face of widespread community and environmen-
tal opposition. Before forcing opponents to take the controversy to
a trial on the merits, such developers might first want to undertake
a sober appraisal of the risks associated with such a trial and, if
these risks appear significant, seriously explore settlement opportu-
nities. It is a course of action that Majestic Realty pursued to its
benefit, and that Lennar did not to its detriment.
B. Lessons for California: 2003 Railyard Revitalization Workshop
The situation with the Cornfield and Taylor Yard is reflective of
the status of many former railyard sites throughout California.
Many of these railyards are located in downtown, urbanized areas,
contain both historic structures and extensive subsurface contami-
nation, and are surrounded by communities that are traditionally
park-poor. These sites therefore present both challenges and op-
portunities. As Michael Casey, director of special properties for
Union Pacific Railroad, noted: "Because [abandoned railyards] are
big doughnut holes in the middle of urban areas, there's no lack of
ideas about what do to with them."369
To help collect and generate such ideas, on November 20,
2003, the California Center for Land Recycling (CCLR) hosted an
all-day workshop in the state capital, Sacramento, entitled Next Stop:
Rail Yard Revitalization.370 CCLR is a nonprofit organization based
in San Francisco, focused on redeveloping contaminated brown-
field sites (sites with known or potential subsurface contamina-
tion). The Next Stop workshop was held, appropriately, at the
California State Railroad Museum.371
The event included a panel session entitled "From Railways to
Greenways, Open Space and Recreational Activities."372 Markus
Niebanck, the TPL environmental consultant responsible for over-
seeing the environmental remediation of the Cornfield, was a pre-
senter on this pane1.373 Niebanck discussed the particular role that
TPL played in the successful transformation of the Cornfield to
parkland, and outlined other ways that private land trusts such as
369. Todd Johnson, Rail Yard Infill, URB. LAND, June 2003.
370. CAL. CTR. FOR LAND RECYCLING, WORKSHOP MATERIALS FOR NEXT STOP: RAIL YARD
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TPL can assist in moving railyard-to-greenspace projects fonvard. 374
The November 2003 Next Stop workshop also included a session
on the plans for the former Union Pacific Sacramento Railyard.375
This 247-acre site is adjacent to the Sacramento River,376 a water-
way that, unlike the Los Angeles River, flows year-round and is in a
much more natural state. The plans for the Sacramento Railyard
are similar to the Cornfield plans in that they involve environmen-
tal remediation, riverfront considerations, historic structure preser-
vation, and the creation of new parkland.377 However, the
Sacramento Railyard plans also call for the construction of new of-
fice, residential, and bus transportation space.378
The Next Stop workshop went on to offer case studies of other
railyard revitalization projects around the state, such as the
Truckee Railyard near Lake Tahoe and the renovation (for retail
and residential space) of historic Central Station in West Oak-
land.379 CCLR's Next Stop workshop evidences the growing interest
throughout California in the cleanup and reuse of abandoned ur-
ban railyards. In this regard, the Cornfield is looked to as an exam-
ple of what can be accomplished at former railyard sites when the
right funding, community support, and government decision-mak-
ing fall into place.
C. Lessons for the Nation: 2002 Urban Rivers Restoration Initiative
In the Cornfield situation, the only federal involvement related
to the role of HUD funding. To recall, HUD funding initially
helped support Majestic Reality's reindustrialization project.
HUD's later requirement for a NEPA EIS stalled the project, lend-
ing support to the Chinatown Yards Alliance's call for considera-
tion of the parkland alternative.
Since California State Parks took title to the Cornfield in 2001,
the federal government has launched a coordinated effort to pro-
mote the restoration of the nation's urban rivers. In July of 2002,
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers (Army Corps) entered into a Memoran-
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the two agencies to address water quality, economic revitalization,
and public use of urban rivers.38o
The July 2002 MOU led to the creation of the federal Urban
Rivers Restoration Initiative (URRI), which in 2003 selected eight
pilot projects around the country. The URRI pilot projects are lo-
cated on the following rivers: Anacostia River (in Washington, D.C.
and Maryland); Blackstone and Woonasquatucket Rivers (in
Rhode Island and Massachusetts); Elizabeth River (in Virginia);
Tres Rios (in Arizona); Passaic River (in New Jersey); Gowanus Ca-
nal and Bay (in Brooklyn, New York); Fourche Creek (in Little
Rock, Arkansas); and City Creek (in Salt Lake City, Utah).381
An analysis of all of the URRI pilot projects is beyond the scope
of this article, but there is one URRI pilot-City Creek in Salt Lake
City-that merits further discussion because of its similarities to
380. Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency and the U.S. Department of the Army, Subject: Restoration of Degraded Urban
Rivers (July 2, 2002) (on file with author).
Many urban reaches of rivers in the United States suffer from contaminated sedi-
ments, degraded water quality, and lost habitat. These conditions adversely affect
human health, as well as the ecological value of aquatic resources, and limit recre-
ational and other economic uses. Coordination of the activities of the signatory
agencies in addressing the problems of aquatic sediment contamination aims to
significantly improve public health and the effectiveness of efforts to restore the
use and enjoyment of these rivers.
The EPA addresses river sediment contamination through a variety of environ-
mental programs in the Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response
(OSWER), and various programs in the Office of Water (OW). Likewise, the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) is involved with numerous river-related activi-
ties, including operation and maintenance of navigation channels and harbors,
flood control, and ecosystem restoration. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is
responsible for the safe, reliable, and efficient waterborne transportation systems
for the movement of commerce, national security purposes and recreation. The
Corps is responsible for 25,000 miles of commercially navigable waterways and
299 deep draft harbors, many of which are located in urban areas.
The above programs can lead to remedial investigation/feasibility studies
under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act (CERCLA), the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) , and
USACE environmental reconnaissance and feasibility studies, including those for
environmental dredging under the Water Resources Development Act (WRDA)
as well as projects addressed by the EPA's Office of Water (OW) under the Clean
\-Vater Act, all focused on the same reaches of contaminated urban rivers. Thus,
this MOU relates to cooperation between EPA's remediation and water quality
activities and the USACE's environmental restoration, navigation, and waterways
maintenance activities.
Id. at Art. II.
381. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency & U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, Urban Rivers Restoration
Initiative Fact Sheet (July 2003) (on file with author).
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the ongoing Los Angeles River restoration efforts. City Creek is a
tributary to the Jordan River. In 1910, two miles of City Creek were
encased in a hidden underground channel below North Temple
Street in the Salt Lake City downtown area.382 This submersion and
encasement destroyed all of the riparian and recreational values of
the waterway for this two-mile stretch.383
Prior to the initiation of the URRl pilot project, EPA had
pledged funding to assist in the cleanup and redevelopment of a
650-acre contaminated tract of land located just to the east of the
submerged portion of City Creek.384 This effort, known as the
Gateway District Brownfields Project, is now being linked with a
new Army Corps plan to "daylight" the underground channe1.385
The City Creek daylighting project, which is being undertaken pur-
suant to the aquatic ecosystem restoration section of the Water Re-
source Development Act of 1996,386 will restore twelve acres of
riparian habitat along 7,900 feet of "uncovered" creek.387
Like the Los Angeles River, which was entombed in concrete in
the 1930s, the two-mile downtown stretch of Utah's City Creek had
been engineered into non-existence. In certain respects, City
Creek's entombment was even more complete. It was not merely
transformed into a concrete eyesore, it was buried from sight alto-
gether. From 1910 onward, it flowed unseen beneath downtown
Salt Lake City. By the time the URRl pilot project was announced
in 2003, there were few people alive who had ever experienced this
stretch of City Creek in its pre-engineered condition.
Yet, like portions of the Los Angeles River, the submerged sec-
tion of City Creek is now being un-entombed. The catalyst behind
City Creek's transformation parallels that which lay behind the ef-
forts to reclaim the Cornfield as riverside parkland: the growing
call for urban greenspace that provides a clearer sense of place, of
history, and of relation to the natural world.
IX. CONCLUSION: UPTOWN DOWNRIVER
The tale of the Cornfield is in fact many tales.
382. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency & U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, Urban Rivers Restoration
Pilot Fact Sheet: City Creek/Gateway District, Utah (2003) (on file with author) [hereinaf-




386. Id.; see also 33 U.S.C. § 2330 (2000).
387. City Creek Fact Sheet, supra note 382.
2004] LOS ANGELES' CORNFIELD 347
It is the tale of disenfranchised communities, each with long
legacies of discrimination, banding together politically to demand
urban parkland, in part to vindicate what they perceived as wrong-
ful past seizures of real property.
It is the tale of how effective public interest environmentalliti-
gation created the conditions that made possible the acquisition of
a parcel for parkland that was on the verge of being redeveloped
for industrial purposes.
It is the tale of how a land trust organization, a state environ-
mental agency and a state parks agency came together to forge a
strategy that would result in the remediation of a contaminated
railyard to turn-key park condition.
It is the tale of how a neglected 1930 blueprint for a city park
system has been rediscovered to help create a new urban river
greenway.
It is the tale of how the ecological vision of an artist helped
ignite public imagination about what an urban river and its adja-
cent lands were and might become. Lewis MacAdams insisted that
"[y]ou can hear laughter from beneath her concrete corset," and,
eventually, people began to listen.388
It is a tale that is Los Angeles-specific but has wider implica-
tions. Because all cities have their own tales of discrimination, envi-
ronmental degradation, and abused natural resources, the
Cornfield is not merely some isolated incident. It is a story that
resonates more broadly and more deeply. Perhaps this is why in
January of 2004 The New Yorker published an article on recent ef-
forts to reinvent and reclaim the Los Angeles River.389 In The New
Yorker piece, former California State Senator 'Tom Hayden ob-
served that the struggle over the Cornfield and the Los Angeles
River is part of the city's larger struggle to make sense of itself:
"We've had to organize saving the river around nostalgia, because
there is a constituency for nostalgia in Los Angeles that rivals the
constituency for amnesia."390 Hayden's comment leaves unan-
swered whether this nostalgia is based on the historical river that
once flowed through the city or rather some collective fabrication
of the type of river that the city wishes it had but never in fact did.
Perhaps this is also why The New York Times recently ran a front
388. From MacAdams' poem, To Artesia, reprinted in MORRISON & LAMONICA, supra
note 1, at 27.
389. Friend, supra note 62.
390. Id. at 43.
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page story on the City of Los Angeles' strange and evolving rela-
tionship to its river. The reporter did much of his research through
the unconventional method of paddling a kayak down the river's
length:
[T] 0 travel down it-not walking on its banks but afloat, in a
kayak, as it lurches in successive straightaways to the sea-is to see
the Los Angeles River as something else. It is still a sump trench,
but it is also an uncharted adventure, and at rare times it looks
and acts like something living.391
There is a sense that the saga of the Cornfield and the Los An-
geles River is a metaphor for something. The question is for what.
391. Charlie LeDuff, Los Angeles by Kayak: Vistas of Concrete Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8,
2003, at AI.
